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Abstract 
Prior to this study there had been little research into the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) in 
response to names of faces. The literature favoured inferential theories for explaining 
the bases of the FOK. Experiment 1 aimed to explore the two leading inferential 
theories (the cue-familiarity hypothesis and the target-accessibility hypothesis) in 
relation to names of famous faces. The study required participants to indicate their 
familiarity with each face and to retrieve semantic knowledge, where possible, whilst 
making a FOK judgement and a tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) judgement. The results 
provide some support for both theories; however, the results suggest that neither 
theory can account solely for the basis of the FOK. Experiment 2 explored 
psychophysiological arousal of the FOK state by measuring skin conductance 
response (SCR). The results revealed no difference in SCR between any of the 
analysed states (non-FOK, FOK and TOT).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Metamemory is widely defined as knowledge and awareness of one’s own 
memory. It includes the ability to self-monitor what is, and what is not, stored within 
memory. One fascinating aspect of metamemory is the experience referred to as the 
feeling of knowing (FOK). It is the state of believing that a specific piece of 
information exists within memory and can later be retrieved, even though that piece 
of information can currently not be recalled (Miner & Reder, 1994). The feeling of 
knowing is not just an experimental phenomenon, but an experience that serves a 
purpose and an importance in everyday life. Being able to reflect upon and monitor 
what we know is essential, so much so that Metcalfe and Shimamura (1994) describe 
both self-reflection and personal knowledge as forming the basis of human 
consciousness. The memory-monitoring process, which yields FOK judgements, is an 
important process that has been described as significantly contributing to the 
efficiency of the human information-processing system (Hart, 1965). Despite the 
diverse and sophisticated storage and retrieval capabilities of the human memory, it is 
still fallible, and it is this fallibility of memory that makes the everyday experience of 
FOKs invaluable (Hart, 1967b). A fallible memory storage means that retrieval 
failures are inevitable thus an additional process such as the FOK, that can assess 
storage states when such a failure occurs, is beneficial (Hart, 1967b).  
 
Experiencing a FOK causes memory search-and-retrieval to be far more 
efficient. This is because the FOK can act like a signal. When presented with a 
question, or a need to attempt to retrieve information from memory, an individual 
may experience a FOK that signals that the sought-after information is indeed 
available (or, more likely to be available) in memory and it is therefore worth 
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commencing, or continuing, a search for the sought-after information (Koriat, 2000). 
If the information is not available in store, and the individual does not have a FOK 
(non-FOK), then the individual will not waste time searching for it; thus FOKs enable 
the memory system to be more effective. Furthermore, FOK judgements are 
considered to be relatively reliable judgements. The generalised finding is that FOKs 
are good predictors of subsequent recognition of previously unrecalled targets (e.g. 
Hart, 1967a; Nelson, Gerler and Narens; 1984; Metcalfe, 1986), although they 
certainly are far from perfect (Blake, 1973). 
 
The FOK is a remarkable experience, in the sense that even though the 
individual cannot remember the information, they know that they know it. It would 
seem that we can know we know something incredibly quickly; the FOK has been 
suggested to be rapid and based on unconscious processes (e.g. Paynter, Reder & 
Kieffaber, 2009). Souchay and Isingrini (2012) stress the importance of accurate 
metacognitive judgements. They state that accurate metamemory functioning leads to 
more effective memory performance, meaning that accurate metacognitive 
judgements are essential. If metacognitive judgements are incorrect, then the 
behavioural/control actions that follow as a result of the metacognitive judgement are 
likely to be ineffective. It is believed that such FOK judgements occur implicitly in 
everyday situations, yet one is not consciously aware of making these rapid decisions 
about knowing (Reder & Ritter, 1992). The FOK is not just an experimental 
phenomenon. FOKs are very common and occur for various forms of memory 
materials, including; names, dates, addresses, numbers and places (Hart, 1965). 
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However, despite being a common experience, the FOK is considered to be a 
complex experience. Brown (2000) expresses how complex the FOK experience is; 
“no single feeling, of rightness, familiarity and so forth is sufficient to describe them, 
nor has any single hypothesis so far been sufficient to account for them”. This 
essential every day, yet complex, experience known as the FOK has sparked much 
debate into the bases of such an experience. There has been much research into FOKs 
since the first experimental investigations, such as Hart’s studies (1965, 1967a, 
1967b). However, as highlighted by Koriat (1993), the majority of the literature on 
memory monitoring shares a common attitude that avoids addressing the basis for the 
FOK. Instead, much of the literature takes the memory monitoring ability for granted 
and focuses primarily on why individual’s metamemory judgements are not perfectly 
accurate (Koriat, 1993). Nevertheless, several theories attempting to explain the basis 
of the FOK have emerged. The theories for the bases of FOKs can be classified into 
two groups; direct access theories and inferential theories. 
  
1.1 The Trace-access Theory 
The earliest theory for the bases of FOK was the trace-access theory (Hart, 
1965), also known as the direct-access theory. In a series of experiments, published in 
a series of papers (Hart 1965, 1966, 1967a, 1967b), Hart was the first to empirically 
investigate the FOK. Hart’s view was that FOKs are based on individual’s having a 
privileged direct-access to memory traces. 
 
Hart’s research focused on the accuracy of FOKs, primarily because Hart had 
noted that earlier investigations were limited in several respects and did not answer, 
nor ask, what Hart considered to be perhaps the most important question about FOKs; 
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are they accurate? Hart used general information questions (1965, 1967a) and learned 
paired-associates as memory materials (1967b). Hart aimed to test the presupposition 
that a FOK is an accurate indicator of what is in memory by using a paradigm that he 
termed the recall-judgement-recognition (RJR) paradigm. In the RJR paradigm, 
participants are given a cue (such as a general knowledge question) and asked to 
recall the answer. If participants fail to provide an answer, participants are then asked 
to make a FOK judgement as to whether they believe they would be able to select the 
correct answer in a multiple-choice test. To test the accuracy of the participant’s FOK 
judgements, the final stage of the RJR paradigm is a multiple-choice test, in which 
participants are required to try and recognise the correct answer from a list of 
alternative answers. 
 
Hart (1967a) hypothesised that if a FOK is an accurate indicator of memory 
storage then participants should perform better during the recognition test on items 
which they indicated a FOK compared to items that they indicated a non-FOK. The 
results of his studies confirmed this and Hart concluded that FOKs are accurate 
predictors of what is in memory. At the time, this was a novel finding, as prior to 
Hart’s work it had not been empirically shown that individuals could accurately judge 
if an answer was in memory, despite not being able to currently recall that answer.  
 
Hart’s theory for the basis of FOKs has since been labelled the trace-access 
theory. This is because Hart expresses ideas that suggest that individuals have access 
to the strength of memory traces. Hart does not go into great detail about the bases of 
FOKs, because his research was primarily based on the accuracy of FOK judgements, 
not its basis. In fact, he explicitly states that how the monitor works is unknown; 
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along with the neural mechanisms necessary and the variables that affect it (Hart, 
1965). Hart does, however, persistently refer to the process yielding FOK judgements 
as being the ‘memory-monitoring process’ (Hart, 1965, 1966, 1967a and 1967b), 
which has since been inferred that Hart believed individuals to have a monitor which 
has the ability to identify whether a piece of information is within memory or not. 
Hart (1965) describes the process of making a FOK judgement by stating that 
individuals 'in some way, monitor or check what they do remember and arrive at a 
decision about what they might remember’. He states that the term 'memory-
monitoring' describes the process that intervenes between recall and recognition 
(Hart, 1965). 
 
The trace-access theory suggests that individuals have access to memory 
traces even when they are unable to recall the item from memory. The theory suggests 
that it is this access to memory traces that allows individuals to make judgements 
about their memory; thus, it is the access to memory traces that is the basis for the 
FOK experience. As discussed, Hart (1965) suggests that when individuals make 
FOK judgements, or non-FOK judgements, they monitor or check what they do 
remember to arrive at a decision about what they might remember. Hart’s opinion 
would mean that individuals have a privileged access to items in memory, despite 
being unable to currently recall the items.  
 
Furthermore, Hart (1967b) discussed his idea of a recognition threshold. He 
suggested that there is a threshold for activation of a FOK signal that is activated via 
the memory-monitoring process. He suggests that this threshold lies between recall 
and baseline. The threshold for the FOK is lower than the threshold for recall. Hart’s 
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idea of a threshold is that sometimes memory traces can exist which are too weak to 
be monitored; it is only when a memory trace reaches the threshold that a FOK 
judgement can be made. He suggests that memory traces that are too weak to be 
monitored will result in the individual being unable to predict that the item exists 
within memory and can later be recalled or recognised. 
 
This direct access theory of FOKs has largely been abandoned and the leading 
theories are now inferential theories. Inferential theories suggest that FOKs do not 
emerge as a result of direct-access to memory traces; the FOK does not monitor the 
unrecalled target item. Instead, the FOK occurs due to individuals making inferences 
about their knowledge of the sought-after item by using other information in memory. 
Individuals make these inferences of the presence of a target in memory through a 
variety of clues. These clues may include; familiarity with the cue or question (e.g. 
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992), activations from the terms in the cue or question, and 
fragments of the target item itself (e.g. Koriat, 1993). The reason why inferential 
theories are more prominent is because the direct-access theory is difficult to test 
directly. It is difficult to measure independently of recall what is available but not 
accessible. Conversely, heuristic accounts are much easier to test; for example, by 
measuring the different clues which participants can accumulate and determining 
whether these correlate with indicating a FOK judgement. Therefore, inferential 
theories emerged in order to explain how FOKs may be based on making inferences 
from the question terms or from making inferences from information, other than the 
answer, which we can successfully retrieve from memory. 
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1.2 The Cue-familiarity Hypothesis 
The cue-familiarity hypothesis (e.g. Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; 
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) suggests that FOKs are based on familiarity with a 
retrieval cue (e.g. the question itself). This theory suggests that the FOK is based on 
how familiar, or recognisable, the cue is. It is the familiarity with the cue that forms 
the bases of the FOK rather than the partial retrieval of the target answer; as suggested 
by the target-accessibility hypothesis (e.g. Koriat, 1993).  The cue-familiarity 
hypothesis suggests that initial FOKs are based on an evaluation of the question 
which leads to determining both how familiar the question terms seem and how much 
knowledge is known which is related to the question (Reder and Ritter, 1992). Unlike 
the trace-access theory (e.g. Hart, 1965) the cue-familiarity hypothesis does not 
assume that individuals, when making FOK judgements, have access to 
representations of the sought-after information in memory, and instead base their 
FOK judgements purely on the familiarity of the question terms/cue. Schwartz and 
Metcalfe (1992) state that ‘feeling of knowing judgements are made without explicit 
access to the unrecalled information itself. Instead, the monitor assesses the 
familiarity or recognisability of the cue’. The cue-familiarity hypothesis suggests that 
it is this assessment of familiarity or recognisability that causes an initial FOK. 
 
The cue-familiarity model was proposed as an alternative explanation to the 
trace-access theory on the premise that previous research had found that FOKs are not 
completely accurate, and correlate relatively weakly with knowing (performing 
correctly on a recognition task), and therefore might be based on something other than 
knowing an answer (Reder and Ritter, 1992). This hypothesis would suggest that no 
information about the target is required to experience a FOK; merely an assessment of 
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the familiarity of the cue is enough to experience a FOK. Any manipulation that 
increases the familiarity of the cue will in turn cause individuals to report higher rated 
FOK judgements (Metcalfe, 1993). Schwartz and Metcalf (1992) state that ‘any 
variable that increases familiarity will similarly increase FOK’. This relationship 
between FOK and familiarity is demonstrated in Reder (1987, 1988), who showed 
that priming words that would later appear in general information questions resulted 
in greater likelihood of a positive FOK. Reder (1998) manipulated cue-familiarity by 
asking participants to rate a list of words for how frequently they believe the words to 
occur. One third of the words in this task appeared later on in a general information 
question task. This was a method of priming, that allowed some question terms (cues) 
to be primed for familiarity and other cues not primed. The results revealed that the 
cues that had been primed resulted in greater FOK ratings without improving 
participant’s ability to correctly answer the questions. These results (Reder, 1988) 
demonstrated that a manipulation of cue familiarity, that did not increase the 
likelihood of the retrieval of target information, increased FOK ratings, thus, 
supporting the cue-familiarity hypothesis. 
 
In line with this cue-familiarity hypothesis, Schwartz, Benjamin and Bjork 
(1997) suggested that, in terms of names of faces, such FOK judgements are not made 
because one knows the person’s name but because the person’s face is familiar. The 
reasoning is that if the cue is familiar then it is likely that the target has also been 
learnt in the past and the likelihood of recognising the target is increased; thus a FOK 
is experienced. Therefore, the cue-familiarity hypothesis would suggest that when an 
individual finds a face familiar, they will experience a FOK for the name of the face. 
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They will not experience a FOK because they know the person’s name, but because 
the face is familiar. 
 
However, there is a potential problem with regards to cue-familiarity and 
FOKs for the names of familiar faces. It appears instinctively that there are faces 
which one may find highly familiar (for example, a person working in a local shop 
which is used on a regular basis). Their face may be highly familiar, we can identify 
where we have seen them before, and it may even be possible to retrieve a fair amount 
of semantic information about the person. Nevertheless, we know we do not know 
their name (a non-FOK). There are also faces that one may find only slightly familiar 
(for example, an actor) and we may also be familiar with their name and able to know 
that we know their name (a FOK). Such a situation poses a problem for the cue-
familiarity hypothesis because the cue-familiarity hypothesis would predict that the 
person who is found highly familiar would be more likely to lead to a FOK than the 
person whom is found only slightly familiar (as any variable that increases familiarity 
should increase FOK). However, in everyday life, this would seem to not always be 
the case. Just because we find a face highly familiar (e.g. because we see the 
individual often in public) does not mean we automatically feel as though we know 
their name. 
 
1.3 The Target-accessibility Hypothesis 
In contrast to the cue-familiarity hypothesis, which is concerned with how 
familiar the cue itself is, the target-accessibility hypothesis is concerned with the 
amount of information retrieved. The target-accessibility hypothesis is also concerned 
with the ease of access of such information during the search-and-retrieval process 
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that is activated when trying to retrieve the sought-after item from memory. Koriat 
(1993) proposed that a FOK is based on ‘clues accumulated during the initial stages’ 
of the search process. Koriat is against direct-access theories, and insists that 
individuals do not have privileged access to an internal monitor which can inform 
them as to whether a piece of currently unrecalled information exists within memory 
or not. Instead, it is the search-and-retrieval process itself which elicits a FOK. Koriat 
(1993) suggests that as individuals search through memory for a certain piece of 
information it causes a ‘variety of clues to come to mind’. Koriat (1993) states that 
these clues include ‘activations from the terms in the questions’, ‘structural, 
contextual, and semantic attributes’, and ‘fragments of the target, and so on’. 
Therefore, Koriat (1993) would seem to suggest that practically any information 
relating to the given question/cue, or any information retrieved during the search-and-
retrieval process related to the sought-after target item, will be used to base a FOK 
judgement on. He suggests that these clues may influence motivation for further 
search for the sought-after item from memory. Koriat (1993) states that it is this 
successful access to partial information that encourages individual’s further efforts to 
search for the complete sought-after target. The idea is that individuals spend a 
greater length of time searching memory for items which they feel as if they do know, 
rather than items they feel as though they do not know, as demonstrated in several 
studies (Gruneberg, Monks, & Sykes, 1977; Lachman, Lachman, & Thronesbery, 
1979; Nelson et al., 1984; Nelson, & Narens, 1980; as cited in Koriat, 1993). Koriat 
(1993) suggests that this behaviour of extended memory search is a result of 
individuals having access to partial information. 
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Furthermore, as the main assumption of the theory is that a FOK is dependent 
on the accessibility of partial information, it does not matter whether this information 
is correct or incorrect (Koriat, 1993). Koriat (1993) states that previous research (i.e. 
Blake, 1973; Eysenck, 1979; Schacter and Worling, 1985) supports the notion that a 
FOK increases with increasing amounts of correct partial information. Koriat (1993) 
goes on to say that he predicts not only a positive correlation between correct partial 
information and the FOK, but also a positive correlation between incorrect partial 
information and the FOK. Koriat (1993) suggests that it is not always evident to 
observe the correlation between the FOK and incorrect partial information, because 
this relationship is often masked by other factors. However, according to Koriat 
(1993), when the effects of correct partial information are controlled, it should be 
possible to observe the positive correlation between incorrect partial information and 
the FOK. Furthermore, he suggests that there is a negative correlation between correct 
partial information and incorrect partial information, as variables that increase correct 
partial information will generally decrease the amount of incorrect partial 
information. This relationship is outlined in the below figure (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1; The Target-Accessibility model taken from Koriat (1993) 
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PI-C refers to correct partial information (i.e. the number of correct letters 
reported for a target answer) and PI-W refers to incorrect partial information (i.e. the 
number of incorrect letters reported for a target answer). Koriat states that this 
distinction between these two components is not available to participants; they do not 
know whether the letters they have reported are correct or incorrect. What is 
important is the total number of letters reported. The letters in the model represent 
links. 
 
Koriat (1993) explains his model by making the following assumptions 
regarding the FOK process. FOK increases as PI-C increases (link d) and as PI-W 
(link e) increases. Although the two components are not distinguishable to 
participants, items that increase PI-C generally reduce PI-W and so the two should 
negatively correlate across items and conditions (link c). Strength of memory trace 
affects the likelihood of participants performing correctly at recognition (link f). 
Enhanced strength of memory trace will generally increase PI-C (link a) whilst 
reducing PI-W (link b). Strength of memory trace should therefore increase the ratio 
of PI-C to PI-W, and it is this which improves the quality of the accessed partial 
information; therefore, FOK judgements should increase with increased strength of 
the memory trace. PI-C and recognition should correlate positively (link f) due to the 
fact that both these items depend on the strength of the memory trace; meaning that 
PI-C is responsible for the accuracy of the FOK, whilst PI-W is responsible for the 
inaccuracy of the FOK (as PI-W is correlated negatively with recognition; link g, but 
positively with FOK; link e). Koriat suggests that factors that enhance memory 
strength will lead to an increase in FOK accuracy. 
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Furthermore, not only does accessibility of the answer play a role when 
retrieval fails, but also when an answer has been selected, according to Koriat (1993). 
Once an answer has been selected, such cues can be used to evaluate whether the 
answer is likely to be correct, based on the amount of information retrieved and on the 
ease of retrieval. It is this ease of access to such cues and the amount (intensity of 
detail) of information gathered during the search-and-retrieval process which is the 
most vital aspect of the bases of the FOK (Koriat, 1993). Individuals merely assess 
how much information has been retrieved, and the ease of accessing this information, 
in order to infer whether they know the answer or they do not know the answer.  
 
Koriat (1993) also discusses memory strength as a determinant of the FOK. 
He states that memory strength and correct recognition have a positive correlation. 
Memory strength will affect whether partial information is correct or incorrect. For 
targets which are stored in memory, and have an enhanced memory strength, the 
correct partial information will exceed incorrect information and in turn will improve 
the quality of the partial information. Thus, Koriat (1993) states that FOKs should 
increase with increase in memory strength. Furthermore, due to the fact that both 
recognition and correct partial information depend on memory strength, Koriat (1993) 
suggests that both are correlated positively. Koriat (1993) suggests that incorrect 
partial information is responsible for inaccurate FOKs; meaning that incorrect partial 
information is negatively correlated with recognition, but positively correlated with 
FOKs. Koriat (1993) believes that incorrect partial information can be responsible for 
eliciting FOKs, but does not play a role in correct recognition, as outlined in Figure 1.  
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Furthermore, Koriat (1993) discusses how ease of access of partial 
information affects the FOK. He highlights that intensity of the accessed information 
plays a role in individuals being so accurate at predicting recognition performance as 
well as judging the correctness of their responses. Koriat (1993) states that retrieval of 
correct partial information, or indeed retrieval of complete information, is retrieved 
quicker than incorrect information. And it is this retrieval latency that signifies to an 
individual if the information is likely to be correct or incorrect. In terms of the FOK, 
Koriat (1993) considers that ease of access affects the FOK judgement ‘independent 
of the amount of information retrieved’. In other words, the ease of which the 
information comes to mind (retrieval latency), impacts the FOK judgement more so 
than the amount of such information. 
 
This theory suggests that inaccurate FOKs are caused because FOKs are based 
on fast sampling that can sometimes be biased, thus resulting in an inaccurate FOK or 
an inaccurate non-FOK. It is this fast sampling that can cause partial information that 
is incorrect. As previously discussed, this incorrect partial information will elicit a 
FOK. However, when it comes to the recognition task; incorrect partial information is 
negatively correlated with correct recognition.  
 
Koriat (1993) put this model to test, in three separate experiments that aimed 
to address the points proposed in his model. In the first experiment, thirty participants 
were required to memorise four-letter nonsense strings, consisting of English 
consonants. There was a total of forty of these strings. Using the RJR paradigm, 
participants were asked to recall as many letters from each string as possible. They 
were then asked to make a FOK judgment, on a scale of 0-100. Finally, participants 
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were then administered a recognition test, in which eight distractors were used. The 
results revealed that the FOK judgements increased with the amount of accessed 
partial information, whether this information was correct or incorrect. Koriat (1993) 
states that his results show that ‘FOK judgements increase systematically and strongly 
as a function of the mere number of letters reported’. The results also support Koriat’s 
claim that correct partial information is positively related to both FOK judgements 
and correct recognition, whereas, incorrect partial information is positively related to 
FOK judgements and negatively related to recognition. Furthermore, Koriat also 
claims that his results demonstrate that improved memory is associated with improved 
metamemory, which is mediated by greater quality of the accessed partial 
information. Experiment two (Koriat, 1993) was much the same as experiment one. 
However, it used five-letter string words and recorded latency of recall. The results 
generally replicated the results from experiment 1, but provided additional support for 
the model. The results suggest that more accurate metamemory reports were 
associated with shorter recall latencies, than were the less accurate metamemory 
reports.  
 
Experiment 3 differed from experiment 1 and 2 in terms of stimuli used. Both 
experiment one and two tested the target-accessibility model by defining accessed 
information in terms of number of individual letters recalled from a string. However, 
experiment three took into account that partial information can relate to other features 
than fragments of the target (singular letters). Therefore, words that differed to the 
participant’s language were used and participants were asked to recall the translated 
words and identify the attribute (the semantic connotations of the word as good or bad 
i.e. the word ‘murder’ would be considered bad and the word ‘fluffy’ would be 
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considered good). The results revealed that FOK judgements were higher for the 
times that participants correctly identified the attributes (good or bad connotations), as 
compared to the times when participants had no partial attribute information. 
However, the results revealed that correct attribute identification and incorrect 
attribute identification showed no significant difference when it came to percentage of 
correct recognition. Recognition performance was decreased by incorrect attribute 
identification, but was not increased by correct attribute identification. In general, 
Koriat (1993) claims that the results from this third experiment indicate that 
participants’ confidence in their FOK judgements is facilitated by access to attribute 
information, and that the target-accessibility hypothesis can be applied to situations 
where the partial information concerns attributes of the target, rather than fragments 
of the target. 
 
1.4 The Noncriterial-recollection Hypothesis 
Furthermore, Koriat’s (1993) target-accessibility model was expanded by 
Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos and Meeks (2010), who developed a theory known as the 
noncritierial-recollection hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that the retrieval of 
noncriterial information plays a role in metacognitive predictions, such a FOKs. Non-
criterial information is a term used to describe additional information that is brought 
to mind during retrieval attempts regardless of whether it is directly relevant to the 
given task (Brewer et al., 2010). Although Koriat's (1993) model is focussed on the 
accumulation and ease of access of information, it does not go into depth about the 
effect additional irrelevant information may have on the magnitude of FOK 
judgements. Therefore, the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis expands Koriat's 
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(1992) target-accessibility model and explores the contribution that additional 
noncriterial information may have on FOK judgements. 
 
Experimentally, noncriterial recollection is typically investigated using 
noncriterial recollection paradigms, in which participants encode information from 
two different source dimensions simultaneously (e.g. Toth & Parks, 2006; Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1996). One source dimension is encoded deeply, whereas the other is 
encoded weakly. This experimental design provides a way to investigate dual-process 
theories of memory. Brewer at al. (2010) used the paradigm to investigate FOK 
judgements about a weakly encoded source dimension, which in this case, was gender 
of a narrative voice. Their hypothesis was that stronger rather than weaker memory, 
for the irrelevant source dimension (the gender of the voice), would lead to more FOK 
judgements. The results were consistent with their hypothesis. These results, in their 
opinion, confirm that when additional information about a memory trace is available, 
even if it is noncriterial, it influences the individual’s confidence to be able to 
recognise an unrecalled answer to the given question (FOK judgements). 
 
1.5 The Combined Hypothesis 
Initially the two hypotheses; target accessibility hypothesis and the cue-
familiarity hypothesis were regarded as independent and competing hypotheses. 
However, more recently it has been proposed that both hypotheses could co-exist 
(Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). It is suggested that the two could work hand-in-hand to 
cause and influence FOKs. Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) suggest that the two 
accounts have more in common than it first appears. They state that the major aspect 
that both these accounts share in common is the fact that both hypotheses suggest that 
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a FOK relies upon an inferential process as opposed to an individual having direct 
access to memory traces (i.e. the trace-access theory by Hart, 1965). Furthermore, 
both hypotheses share in common the belief that cues, no matter how valid or invalid 
they may be, will equally influence the FOK. However, the two theories are 
fundamentally different in terms of their belief of what causes a FOK. The cue-
familiarity hypothesis suggests that a FOK is based on cues which are received prior 
to attempted retrieval, whereas the target-accessibility hypothesis suggests that a FOK 
is based on cues retrieved once the search-and-retrieval process has begun. However, 
Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) make an influential point when they consider that the 
two mechanisms could be ‘complementary, each making a separate and distinct 
contribution to FOK, and, furthermore, that they may interact in affecting FOK’. They 
suggest that familiarity with the cue is important because it leads to memory 
interrogation, which in turn leads to accumulation of partial information. Depending 
on how much information arises during this search depends on whether a FOK is 
experienced or not. Indeed, the results from their study (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001) 
support this interactive model. The results revealed that both cue familiarity and 
accessibility affected FOKs; when cue-familiarity was higher, the effects of 
accessibility were stronger. 
 
1.6 The Dual-process Hypothesis 
Furthermore, one hypothesis suggests that both the cue-familiarity and target-
accessibility hypotheses are two separate theories, which do not co-exist but are 
merely responsible for two different metamemory experiences. Sun, Chen, Bai and 
Chen (2014) compared FOK and the feeling of not knowing (non-FOK) judgements 
in a study that aimed to unveil the influence which processing depth and memory 
 22 
material has on such judgements. A non-FOK refers to the feeling that the answer is 
not known and is the only other outcome when a FOK judgement is not made i.e. if a 
participant is not experiencing a FOK then they are experiencing a non-FOK. Not 
having a feeling of knowing, and knowing that you do not know something, are both 
referred to as a non-FOK. Using the RJR paradigm with cue-target word pairs, they 
manipulated the depth of processing. The results revealed that the accuracy of FOK 
judgements increases under deep processing. The researchers suggest that this result 
indicates that a FOK judgement is determined by the amount of accessed information, 
and suggest that this is explained by Koriat’s (1993) target-accessibility model. 
Conversely, non-FOK is not determined in such a way. Sun et al. (2014) suggest that 
their results imply that FOK and non-FOK judgements may ‘belong to two 
dissociable cognitive processes’, which they believe verifies the dual-process 
hypothesis, which was put forward by Lui, Su, Xu and Chan (2007). They suggest 
that the FOK judgement is based on accessibility, whereas, the non-FOK judgement is 
based on low cue-familiarity. 
 
1.7 Tip-of-the-tongue 
A tip-of-the tongue (TOT) is an experience defined as ‘a strong feeling that a 
target word, although currently unrecallable, is known and will be recalled’ 
(Schwartz, 2002; pg. 5). Although FOKs and TOTs are similar in the sense that both 
are related to knowledge that is currently unavailable, they are distinct experiences. 
Unlike being in a TOT state, whereby recall is felt to be imminent, a FOK is not 
concerned with the timing of retrieval but with the likelihood of recognising the 
currently unrecallable information at a later point in time (Brown, 2012). Imminence 
appears to be a part of what researchers consider important for a TOT; for example, 
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Brown and McNeil (1966) instructed participants with the following; ‘If you are 
unable to think of the word but feel sure that you know it and that it is on the verge of 
coming back to you then you are in a TOT state’. 
 
Furthermore, another difference between the two phenomena is that TOTs 
occur for only a small number of items, whereas FOKs are thought to occur at a much 
higher frequency; in fact, it is suggested that FOKs can apply to all items (Brown, 
2012). Previous research supports this claim that FOKs and TOTs are two separate 
cognitive functions. Schwartz (2008) showed that working memory load decreased 
the number of TOT judgments but increased the number of FOK judgments; 
suggesting that FOKs and TOTs have differing underlying processes to one another. 
Widner et al. (1996) found that the manipulation of demand characteristics affected 
TOT ratings but not FOKs. Furthermore, patients with frontal damage, resulting in 
impaired functioning in the prefrontal cortex, are susceptible to impaired FOKs. 
However, this same impairment is not reflected in TOTs; suggesting that the two may 
either rely on differing underlying processes or that making a FOK judgement is a 
more difficult task than making a TOT judgement (Widner, Otani, & Winkelman, 
2005). 
 
However, some researchers suggest that the two are not distinct processes and 
that TOTs are merely extreme FOKs (e.g. Litman et al, 2005), and have participants 
rank their experience on a scale with levels of FOK and a TOT as the end point of the 
scale (Gardiner, Craik & Bleasdale, 1973; Ferrand 2001, experiment 1). Brown 
(2012), concludes that the research to date suggests that TOT and FOK responses are 
likely to be highly related though still separate cognitive functions which may share 
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some of the same underlying processes. Therefore, in this current study the two will 
be referred to as two separate experiences and both FOKs and TOTs will be assessed 
to compare their predictive power at recognition of previously unrecalled information. 
 
Much like FOKs, most explanations of TOTs can be classified into one of two 
broad categories (Brown, 2012). These categories are direct access and inferential. 
The direct access view is that a TOT emerges due to partial access of the information 
stored within memory; although the target word cannot currently be recalled, the 
individual has access to the sought-after word’s trace within memory and the sought-
after word receives partial activation. Conversely, the inferential view is that TOTs 
emerge due to the individual making inferences about their knowledge of the sought-
after word. Inferences are made from other information about the sought-after word 
that they can access from memory; for example, how familiar the cue is (e.g. Metcalfe 
et al., 1993), or an assessment of how much information about the target can be 
retrieved (e.g. Koriat, 1993).  
 
1.8 Face Processing 
Using faces when investigating the bases of FOKs may be a better option, than 
word stimuli, to investigate the cue-familiarity hypothesis. This is not only because 
putting a name to a face happens in everyday life, but also because FOKs for names 
of faces may provide the strongest support for the cue-familiarity hypothesis as 
compared to FOKs for word stimuli. Faces are more likely to drive familiarity-based 
recognition than other types of stimuli; individuals rely more heavily on familiarity 
for face recognition than for recognition of other types of stimuli (Aly, Knight & 
Yonelinas, 2010). In their study, Aly et al. (2010) required participants with amnesia 
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to study 120 drawings of faces, followed by a recognition task. Aly et al. (2010) also 
administered a verbal memory task, in which they used single words as stimuli. The 
results showed that overall word recognition was more impaired than overall face 
recognition in amnesic patients. Aly et al. (2010) argued that their findings suggest 
that the reason why amnesic patients may often appear less impaired on face 
recognition, than word recognition, may be because face recognition relies more 
heavily on familiarity than other types of stimuli and it is the familiarity aspect which 
has been less affected. Thus, using faces, as opposed to word stimuli, may provide a 
better assessment of the cue-familiarity hypothesis. It would be expected that if cue-
familiarity elicits FOKs, then using faces as stimuli would provide strong support for 
the cue-familiarity hypothesis. On the other hand, if FOKs for names of faces do not 
appear to be based primarily on cue-familiarity, then we can infer that the likelihood 
of cue-familiarity being responsible for FOKs for verbal stimuli (i.e. general 
knowledge questions) is very unlikely. 
 
The research on face perception has been led, and highly influenced, by the 
work of Bruce and Young (1986). They proposed a model to explain face recognition. 
It was a stage model; in that the components, or stages, of face processing are 
sequential and have to be fulfilled before another stage of face processing can take 
place. Their model suggests that once the face has been seen, the first stage of the 
model is structural encoding. This structural encoding produces a set of descriptions 
of the face that has been presented (Bruce & Young, 1986), and provides information 
for the facial recognition units (FRU). 
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Bruce and Young (1986) state that it is each FRU that contains structural 
codes relating to the description of one face known to a person. FRUs compare the 
incoming information, from the face currently being presented, to structural 
information (i.e. lip shape, nose shape) stored about familiar faces. Furthermore, the 
FRUs can access what Bruce and Young (1986) termed the person identity nodes. 
They suggest that just like the FRUs, there is one person identity node (PIN) for each 
person known. The PINs contain specific information about the person, such as their 
job, their hobbies, and so on. The difference between the FRUs and PINs is that the 
PIN is the point where the person is recognised, whereas the FRU is the point where 
the face is recognised. The FRU will respond to any view of a person’s face, but will 
not respond to hearing the person’s voice or their name. Whereas, the PIN can be 
accessed via a variety of ways; the face, name, voice or even clothing (Bruce and 
Young, 1986).  
 
From the PIN, Bruce and Young (1986) suggest that a name is generated. It 
would not be possible to go straight from recognising a face to generating a name; the 
PIN must be activated first. They suggest that this is the point, at name generation, 
when TOT’s arise; the FRU has been activated, the PIN has also been activated, but 
we are unable to recall the name. Although the authors consider where a TOT may 
arise, they do not consider the FOK. However, to relate the FOK to the model; it is 
evident that the FRU must be activated before a FOK in response to the name of a 
face can be elicited. This means that the face must be presented, and be established as 
familiar; the structural code of the incoming face must match the stored structural 
codes of a familiar face. The cue-familiarity hypothesis would appear to suggest that 
this is the only stage from Bruce and Young’s (1986) model that needs to be activated 
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to elicit a FOK. However, the target accessibility hypothesis (Koriat, 1993), and in 
particular the expanded view of the target accessibility hypothesis (the noncriterial-
recollection hypothesis, Brewer et al., 2010), would suggest that not only would the 
FRU need to be activated, but so would the PIN. The activation of the PIN would 
mean that person specific information was then available to the individual; something 
which Brewer et al., (2010) would consider essential for the occurrence of a FOK. 
 
Following the Bruce and Young (1986) model, Burton, Bruce and Johnson 
(1990) proposed an Interactive Activation with Competition (IAC) model which built 
upon this earlier model. Though still keeping with the basic principles of FRUs and 
PINs, this IAC model suggests that the units are connected to each other through links 
that can either be excitatory or inhibitory; in that they either increase the unit’s 
activation or decrease the unit’s activation. One such important difference between 
the two models is the difference between the model’s explanations of PINs (Bruce 
and Young 2012). Burton et al. (1990) suggest that a visual input of a face is 
classified as familiar at the PINs, unlike Bruce and Young (1986) who suggested that 
feelings of familiarity happened at the FRUs. Bruce and Young’s (1986) model did 
not explicitly state where semantic information was stored, whereas in the IAC 
model, Burton et al., (1990) clearly state that, unlike the earlier model, semantic 
information is separate to the PINs and that the PINs act as nodes that allow access to 
the semantic information. 
 
In relation to the FOK, using this updated model of face recognition, both 
hypotheses (cue-familiarity and target-accessibility) would suggest that the PIN is 
accessed. As Burton et al. (1990) suggest that in order for a face to seem familiar, it is 
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not just the FRU that needs to be activated but also the PIN. Therefore, the cue-
familiarity hypothesis would suggest that the PIN would be accessed but that the link 
from the PIN to the semantic information is not yet activated, or it is blocked; and this 
is all that is needed in order for a FOK to occur. However, the target-accessibility 
hypothesis would suggest that not only would the PIN need to be accessed, but that 
the link between the PIN and the semantic information would need to be active, in 
order to retrieve semantic information about the person. 
 
Furthermore, Bruce and Young (2012) discuss the phenomenon of how name 
recognition does not tend to fail in the same way in which naming a person does. 
Recalling a person’s name happens in a sequential pattern, as described in their model 
(1986); whereby the face is first recognised, followed by the retrieval of person 
specific semantic information, which in turn results in the generation of the name. 
This recall of names often lets us down, whereas the same cannot be said when it 
comes to name recognition; when we read or hear a known name, we often have no 
problem recalling who the person is (Bruce and Young, 2012). They suggest that 
problems arise only when we have to generate a name output code in response to a 
face. This phenomenon, whereby generating a name output in response to a face is 
more challenging and prone to failure than name recognition, reflects the onset of the 
TOT and the FOK experiences. 
 
In this thesis, faces will be used as stimuli to investigate the real-world 
phenomenon of FOKs for names of faces. As individuals, we are presented with faces 
which we are required to ‘put a name to’ in our everyday lives. Cleary (2011) 
highlights how ‘most FOK studies use stimuli other than faces and their 
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corresponding names, even though people’s faces and names are often used to 
illustrate the real-world phenomenon’. Previous research investigating FOKs has 
focused primarily on verbal information. Much of the research has involved general 
information/trivia questions (e.g. Hart, 1965; Metcalfe, 1986; Smith and Clark, 1993) 
and cue-target word pairs (e.g. Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993; Thomas, 
Bulevich, Dubois, 2012; Sacher. Isingrini and Taconnat, 2013). There have been few 
studies that have deviated away from trivia questions and target word pairs. Namely, 
FOKs for songs and instrumental music have been investigated (Rabinovitz & 
Peynircioğlu, 2011) and FOKs for translations of words (Peynircioğlu & Tekcan, 
2000) have been investigated. Despite the fact that faces are experienced in our 
everyday lives, thus FOKs for names in response to faces are likely to occur on a 
relatively regular basis, there has been little research carried out into FOKs for names 
of faces.   
 
1.9 Faces and The Feeling of Knowing 
One study that has investigated FOKs in response to names of faces is that of 
Hosey, Peynircioğlu and Rabinovitz (2009). In their study, participants viewed 
photographs of faces and were required to report which strategy they used to base 
their FOK ratings on; either the cue-familiarity strategy or the target-accessibility 
strategy. The RJR paradigm was used. In experiment 1, Hosey et al. (2009) presented 
fifty-five famous female faces to their participants. If participants could not recall the 
name of the face, they were required to give a FOK rating between 1 and 5; 
corresponding to ‘not at all certain’ to ‘very certain’. During the recognition phase, 
participants were also required to select one of two options for each face; either they 
indicated that they based their FOK rating on ‘a general sense of familiarity with the 
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photograph’, or they indicated that they based their FOK rating on ‘any specific 
information they remembered about the woman depicted’. When participants reported 
the use of the target-accessibility strategy, they were also asked to write down this 
semantic information. This meant that selecting the target-accessibility strategy was 
more time-consuming for participants than simply selecting the cue-familiarity 
strategy that required no additional information. This is something that may have 
affected the results, as it would have been easier for participants to opt for the cue-
familiarity strategy. Crucially, the participants were not allowed to select both 
options. Hosey et al. (2009) do not state why they did not allow participants to report 
both strategies (i.e. “I felt the face was highly familiar, but I also was able to recall 
semantic information, and this is why I stated that I had a FOK”). Presumably, it is 
because, at this point, Hosey et al. (2009) did not believe, or had not considered that 
the two strategies could co-exist, and were of the opinion that the cause of a FOK 
must be mutually exclusive. This meant that Hosey et al. (2009) were unable to 
consider whether target-accessibility followed a high cue-familiarity ranking. Not 
only this, but participants were also timed. They were given just twenty seconds to 
complete the task for each face. This could be considered as a downfall, due to the 
fact that participant’s search-and-retrieval process was essentially being interrupted. 
Not only were participants under time pressure to rate their FOK judgement but they 
were also under time pressure to report which strategy they had used to make their 
FOK judgement. 
 
Furthermore, in experiment 1, once participants had completed the first phase 
they were then required to complete a recognition test. This test required participants 
to select one name from a list of four possible names. The results of the study 
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revealed that there was no difference in performance on the recognition test between 
the strategies used (cue-familiarity or target-accessibility). In other words, strategy 
used to give a FOK rating made no difference to how accurate that FOK rating was in 
terms of predicting performance on the recognition test. The results also revealed that 
participants were more likely to base their FOK rating on cue-familiarity, rather than 
on target-accessibility. 
 
In experiment 2, Hosey et al. (2009) chose not to use famous faces, but instead 
used photographs of the faces of non-famous women. Their participants were required 
to complete a study phase, in which they were given sixty photographs of these 
women which were labelled with a name and had three pieces of additional 
information associated with each photograph. Participants were given 30 seconds per 
photograph to study the information and make an ‘association between them in their 
mind using any strategy that they found helpful’. Just like experiment 1, participants 
then completed the recall/judgement phase and the recognition phase. However, one 
difference between this experiment and the previous one was that this experiment 
included lures during the recall/judgement phase. This meant that there was an 
additional sixty faces used, which were not in the study phase. The lures were used to 
prevent the participants from giving ‘artificially high FOK ratings’ because they 
knew that all the photographs had been studied. Just like in experiment 1, participants 
were only able to select one strategy. Again, the results of this experiment revealed 
that participants were more likely to report using the cue-familiarity strategy, rather 
than the target-accessibility strategy. 
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Experiment 3 (Hosey et al., 2009) overcame the methodological flaw, 
whereby participants had no option to report the use of both strategies; cue-familiarity 
and target-accessibility. In experiment 3, participants were allowed to report both 
strategies. Hosey et al., (2009) also modified the way in which the target-accessibility 
strategy was reported. In the first two studies, it would have been a longer task for 
participants to select the target-accessibility strategy (as it required them to write 
down more information, as compared to selecting the cue-familiarity strategy), 
whereas, experiment 3 required participants to write a lengthy sentence even if they 
did not recall any information. This was an attempt to discourage participants from 
merely selecting the cue-familiarity strategy, instead of the target-accessibility 
strategy, due to ease. Another modification included only presenting 48 female faces. 
Participants were also asked to rate the attractiveness of each face on a five-point 
scale, and to rate on a five-point scale how well the information about each person 
‘suited’ that particular person. Hosey at al. (2009) state that these additional ratings 
were used just to make sure that their participants paid attention to all aspects of the 
stimulus that was presented to them. Experiment 3 also used verbal cues in some 
cases, instead of photographs. However, the results revealed that the use of stimuli, 
whether verbal or pictorial, had no effect on which strategy participants reported. 
 
The results for experiment 3 (Hosey at al. 2009) revealed that participants 
were trying to make use of both strategies. However, participants rarely reported the 
use of the target-accessibility strategy by itself, without the cue-familiarity strategy. It 
was also found that when cue-familiarity was high, target-accessibility was not 
necessarily present. Hosey et al., (2009) suggested that this reflects that the cue-
familiarity strategy ‘could be used on its own and dissociated’. 
 33 
Overall, Hosey et al. (2009) concluded that from their three experiments that 
FOKs, in response to names of faces, are based on the cue-familiarity hypothesis. 
However, one could argue that a crucial flaw in the Hosey et al. (2009) study is that it 
relied upon participants’ subjective and introspective judgements on deciding which 
strategy they had employed. This subjectivity and use of introspection raises 
questions in terms of the reliability of such self-reports in the domain of metamemory. 
If it were that straightforward, and indeed accurate enough, to rely upon individuals’ 
subjective self-report as to which strategy they had used to report a FOK, there would 
have been little need for the research throughout the years into what FOKs are based 
on.  
 
Furthermore, as suggested by Hosey et al. (2009), participants most likely 
report the cue-familiarity strategy more frequently than the target-accessibility 
strategy, in circumstances where both strategies are being used, due to a bias. In 
experiments 1 and 2, participants are more likely to have a bias in favour of selecting 
the strategy that comes into play at an earlier-stage and appears to be a more dominant 
strategy. It certainly seems plausible that when forced to choose just one strategy, and 
not being given the option to select both, participants would opt for the strategy that 
seems most prominent. Thus, it would seem difficult to infer from these two 
experiments that FOKs for names of faces are predominately based on cue-
familiarity. Experiment 3, overcame this problem by allowing participants to report 
using both strategies. However, experiment 3 (just like experiment 2) did not use 
famous faces, but instead required participants to partake in a study period prior to the 
recall/judgement phase; whereby participants learnt the names and information 
corresponding to a selection of unknown faces. Because of this study period, of just 
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30 seconds per face, it is possible that participants failed to remember much episodic 
information. When an individual is time-constrained, it is difficult to memorise 
episodic information. Thus, in the recall/judgement phase, it would have been much 
easier for participants to rely on the cue-familiarity strategy simply because it is likely 
that all the participants had to rely on to make their FOK judgments was familiarity. It 
could be suggested that participants simply would have struggled to memorise new 
episodic information relating to 48 new faces (which included a name, and three 
pieces of information about the person). Thus, using the familiarity of the face would 
have been an easier strategy. This suggested struggle with memorising all this new 
episodic information is reflected in how well the participants perform on the name 
recall task. Experiment 1, which used famous faces, showed that 39% of the names of 
faces were recalled correctly. Whereas, in experiment 2 and 3, which used novel faces 
and study phases, only 5% and 2.29% (respectively) of the studied names were 
recalled correctly. This highlights that participants struggled to recall information 
about the to-be-learned novel faces; even the names were difficult to retain and recall, 
let alone further semantic information about the faces. Thus, it was no wonder that 
participants would not have been able to use the target-accessibility strategy as often. 
This suggests that by giving participants faces to learn, along with episodic 
information, does not reflect a realistic representation of making FOK judgements in 
everyday life, outside of the lab. Thus, it would seem that the Hosey et al., (2009) 
methodology would influence the likelihood of the cue-familiarity strategy being 
selected and it is not a surprise that their results support the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis. 
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Furthermore, the study also favoured inferential theories, rather than trace-
access theories, as the only two possible outcomes from the study was either one of 
two inferential theories. The results would have led to either the cue-familiarity 
strategy being the cause of a FOK or the target-accessibility strategy being the cause 
of a FOK. Using the methodology of Hosey et al., (2009), the results would have 
always revealed one of these two strategies; as participants were forced to select one 
of the two. The study did not have scope to investigate whether a FOK could be based 
on another hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2: The Feeling of Knowing for names of faces 
2.1 Introduction 
This study aims to investigate FOKs for names of faces. Previous research in 
this area (namely, one study by Hosey et al., 2009) had several limitations; in 
particular, the study relied on participants subjectively reporting the strategies that 
they used to make their FOK judgements. This current study aims to use a more 
objective approach, and not rely on introspection, in order to investigate the bases of 
the FOK for names of faces. 
 
This study will assess the cue-familiarity hypothesis (e.g. Schwartz & 
Metcalfe, 1992) which suggests that familiarity of the cue (the face) is the basis of the 
FOK. A previous study (Batchelor, 2014) investigated whether FOKs for names of 
famous faces were based on the cue-familiarity hypothesis or the target-accessibility 
hypothesis. The study used the RJR method and required participants to indicate 
whether they found each face familiar (to assess the cue-familiarity hypothesis), to 
supply some semantic information about the person (to assess the semantic aspect of 
the target-accessibility hypothesis) and to indicate whether they were experiencing a 
FOK and/or a TOT. The results did not provide support for the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis or the target-accessibility hypothesis. The results revealed that familiarity 
with the face did not always lead to a FOK. In fact, participants were more likely to 
report a non-FOK than a FOK when a face was found familiar but semantic 
information was not recalled. However, the Batchelor (2014) study did not assess the 
levels of subjective familiarity, so it could be speculated that FOKs are experienced 
whenever familiarity reaches a certain threshold. 
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Therefore, this current study aims to investigate how differing levels of cue-
familiarity may influence the FOK by requiring participants to select a level of 
familiarity with each face, on a four-point scale (1: unfamiliar, 2: slightly familiar, 3: 
moderately familiar, 4: highly familiar). This study will investigate whether a FOK 
will be experienced with all three levels of familiarity and whether an increase in 
familiarity is what causes a FOK. If familiarity with the face (the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis) is responsible for causing a FOK, then familiarity levels 2, 3 and 4 should 
all be more likely to lead to a FOK than a non-FOK. If a strong feeling of familiarity 
is required then level 4 familiarity, but not level 2 or 3, should be more likely to lead 
to a FOK than a non-FOK. 
 
This study also aims to assess the validity of the target-accessibility hypothesis 
(Koriat, 1993). The target-accessibility hypothesis suggests that when individuals 
interrogate their memory for a piece of information, a variety of clues come to mind, 
and these include; structural, contextual, and semantic attributes (Koriat, 1993). 
Koriat (1993) suggests that FOKs ‘monitor the mere amount of information 
accessible’ during the search-and-retrieval process. Therefore, Batchelor (2014) 
assessed the role that retrieval of semantic information pertaining to a given 
face/person has on likelihood of experiencing a FOK. The results of the study 
revealed that FOKs are not primarily based on semantic knowledge retrieved during 
the search-and-retrieval process; participants were equally as likely to experience a 
FOK as they were to experience a non-FOK when they could retrieve semantic 
information in response to a face. However, the study did not determine the varying 
depths of retrieved semantic information. Therefore, it could be speculated that 
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retrieval of strong semantic information causes a FOK. This current study aims to 
investigate whether retrieval of a certain depth/amount of semantic information is 
required to cause a FOK. Hanczakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka and Higham (2013) 
suggested that future FOK research should be directed towards investigating the role 
of other factors beyond cue-familiarity on metamemory processes. They suggested 
that one such further investigation would be the volume of information accessed 
during the retrieval process. They express that this is a factor which is ‘clearly related 
to the efficacy of the retrieval process and is at the same time known to be linked to 
the process of metacognitive monitoring’. Thus, the strength of retrieved semantic 
information will be assessed in this study. 
 
If the target-accessibility hypothesis were a good explanation for the bases of 
FOKs, we would expect that the results of this study would show that when 
participants can recall semantic information pertaining to the target person, they will 
experience a FOK. If participants recognise a face, and are able to recall strong 
semantic information, it should lead to a FOK. If participants recognise a face, yet are 
unable to recall semantic information, it should lead to a non-FOK.  
 
Following Koriat and Levy-Sadot’s (2001) hypothesis that cue-familiarity and 
target-accessibility may be two mechanisms that work together to affect a FOK, this 
study will also be investigating if such a dual-model does play a role in the FOK 
experience. If the results reveal that high levels of familiarity combined with retrieval 
of strong semantic information is required before a FOK can be experienced, then it 
will support the notion that the two originally competing hypotheses (cue-familiarity 
and target-accessibility) do make a combined contribution to the bases of the FOK. It 
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is hypothesised that if the results of this study support this dual-model (Koriat & 
Levy-Sadot, 2001), then it will only be with the combination of higher levels of 
familiarity and a strong amount of semantic information. 
 
Furthermore, this study aims to explore the recognition accuracy of FOKs and 
non-FOKs defined by levels of cue-familiarity and strength of retrieved semantic 
information. The study will assess whether the different levels of cue-familiarity have 
an effect on accuracy on a recognition test, for both FOKs and non-FOKs. It is 
hypothesised that if cue-familiarity is the bases of FOKs, then greater cue-familiarity 
will increase the accuracy of the FOK. Therefore, this study will use the RJR 
paradigm to assess the accuracy of FOKs, and non-FOKs, for subsequent recognition 
of previously unrecalled target names. The study will also assess whether the ability 
to recall varying strengths of semantic information has an effect on accuracy on a 
recognition test, again, for both FOKs and non-FOKs. This will enable us to not only 
understand more about how factors which occur before the search-and-retrieval 
process (cue-familiarity), and factors which occur during the search-and-retrieval 
process (accumulation of semantic information) affect recognition performance, but it 
will also help us to determine which is the most predominant factor (FOK, cue-
familiarity or retrieval of semantic information) at predicting subsequent recognition 
of previously unrecalled target names. 
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2.2 Method  
Participants: 40 participants, who were undergraduate students and received 
course credits for participation, were tested individually (32 females and 8 males). 
The mean age of participants was 19 years.   
  
Design: The study used a within-subjects design. The dependent variable was 
the participants’ responses to each face.   
  
Apparatus: The experiment was run with SuperCard. The stimuli were 
presented on an Apple iMac; 21.5” screen.   
   
Materials: 44 images of celebrity faces were used in both the recall and 
recognition phase (see appendix for sample materials). The images were obtained 
online and cropped so that each image was a uniform size. None of the faces 
contained distinctive headwear, eyewear or backgrounds which could help the 
participant to obtain any semantic information about the celebrity, and all images 
were frontal-shots. The celebrity faces ranged in terms of occupation of the person 
(e.g. actors, comedians, sportsmen).    
  
In the recall phase, for each face, participants were presented with questions. 
The questions were (in the given order): ‘what is this persons’ name?’, ‘does this face 
look familiar to you?’ (with the following response options: ‘not at all familiar, 
slightly familiar, moderately familiar, extremely familiar’), ‘would you be able to 
select the correct name from a list of four names?’ (this was the FOK question; the 
response options were: ‘yes’ or ‘no’), ‘are you in a tip of the tongue state’ (response 
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options were: ‘yes’ or ‘no’) and ‘what is this person’s occupation?’ (this was used to 
assess semantic information. Participants were given a text box to type their own 
response) and ‘if you can, please give a fact/piece of information about this person’ 
(this was used to assess the strength of semantic information. Again, participants were 
given a text box to type their own response).  
  
In the recognition phase, participants were presented with a multiple-choice 
test consisting of four names for each given face. The correct name was presented 
within the list in a random order. The other three names consisted of other celebrities 
who were the same gender, of the same occupation and who had names of the same 
ethnic origin as the target name.  
  
Procedure: Participants were seated in front of the screen and were presented 
with the general instructions. The instructions informed participants that the 
experiment consisted of forty-four faces in which they were to answer the given 
questions as honestly as possible. The participants were also given a sheet of paper 
with the definition of a TOT state, and participants were made aware that they should 
refer to this definition if they were to forget it at any point throughout the duration of 
the study. A TOT state was defined as follows: ‘the feeling that you know the name 
and that recall is imminent (likely to occur at any moment)’.   
  
Firstly, in the recall phase, participants were shown a photo of a face and 
asked to give the name of the celebrity. If they could recall the name they were to 
input it and proceed to the next face; they were not required to answer the remaining 
five questions. If participants were unable to recall the name, they were required to 
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proceed to the remaining five questions for that face, before proceeding to the next 
face. Participants were required to respond to all forty-four faces in the recall phase 
before proceeding to the recognition phase.  
  
In the recognition phase, participants were told they would be given a 
multiple-choice test and were instructed to select the correct name from a list of four 
names, for each face. Participants were made aware that they must select a name for 
each face. The participants were shown the same forty-four faces on the screen one at 
a time. Half the participants were shown the faces in the same order as the recall 
phase, and half the participants were shown the faces in reverse order, to control for 
order effects. After each face was presented, the participants were given the multiple-
choice test for each face.  
  
Throughout the experiment all participants were tested individually and were 
able to view each face and work through the questions at their own pace. Participants 
were not permitted to go back to a face or previous questions if they had already 
completed them.    
  
To classify weak and strong semantic information, the responses to the two 
questions pertaining to semantic information were used. If participants 
could only correctly answer ‘what is this person’s occupation?’, then they 
were classified as having only weak retrieval of semantic information. If participants 
could also correctly give a response to the following question, then they 
were classified as having strong retrieval of semantic information; ‘if you can, please 
give a fact/piece of information about this person’. If participants could not answer 
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either of these questions then they were classified as having no retrieval of semantic 
information. This method of classification was used in order to allow a distinction 
between whether participants provided information which clearly specified that 
they knew who the given person was as opposed to vaguely knowing who 
the given person was. This focus on strength was chosen over merely assessing the 
amount of information retrieved (i.e. looking at how many sentences of facts a 
participant could recall) because Koriat (1993) had stated that it is not necessarily 
amount of such information that impacts the FOK judgement. We also considered that 
if we were to ask participants to recall facts, and then judge their amount 
of retrieval, it may not be a true representation of everything the participants had 
recalled due to the participants not wanted to spend additional time typing out 
all of the information they knew about a famous person. Therefore, we chose to select 
this method of asking two questions (one to signify the participant vaguely knew the 
person (weak semantic information) and one to signify that the participant clearly 
knew who the given person was and was able to recall more (strong semantic 
information).  
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2.3 Results   
 
The means (maximum 44) and standard deviations are displayed in table 1.  
 
 
TOT  FOK  Non-
FOK  
Face 
Unknown  
Named 
Correctly  
Named 
Incorrectly  
5.48 
(3.64)  
4.85 
(2.42)  
8.68 (5.1)  9.75 (6.15)  13.23 (7.84)  0.55 (0.85)  
 
Table 1: Means (SD's) for responses during the recall phase.  
 
 
The number of times each metacognitive state (non-FOK, FOK, TOT) was 
experienced during varying levels of cue-familiarity (see figure 2), or varying depths 
of semantic information (see figure 3) could then be identified. 
Figure 2: Graph to demonstrate the number of times each state was experienced during each 
level of cue-familiarity. 
 
 
 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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FOK 0 40 73 80
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Cue-familiarity.
 45 
Figure 3: Graph to demonstrate the number of times each state was experienced during each 
level of recalled semantic information. 
 
 
ANOVAs  
A series of ANOVAs were carried out to determine the effect cue-familiarity 
and retrieval of semantic information has on the likelihood of participants 
experiencing a FOK. 
 
In order to assess the effect of familiarity on likelihood of experiencing a 
FOK, a within-subjects ANOVA was performed. In this ANOVA, FOKs were 
considered separately to TOTs, thus TOTs were excluded from the data. The 
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familiarity levels were; 2 (slightly familiar), 3 (moderately familiar) and 4 (highly 
familiar). There was a statistically significant difference in likelihood of experiencing 
a FOK for the three levels of familiarity, F(2,52) = 38.991, p < .001. Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that there was a significant difference 
between each pair of familiarity levels. Likelihood of experiencing a FOK increased 
from an average of 13% for familiarity level 2 to 40% for familiarity level 3 (p < 
.001) and then increased from 40% for familiarity level 3 to 68% for familiarity level 
4 (p < .001).  
 
In order to assess the effect of familiarity on likelihood of experiencing a 
FOK, a within-subjects ANOVA was performed. In this ANOVA, FOKs and TOTs 
were not considered as two separate phenomena, thus TOTs were included in the data. 
The familiarity levels were; 2 (slightly familiar), 3 (moderately familiar) and 4 (highly 
familiar). There was a statistically significant difference in likelihood of experiencing 
a FOK for the three levels of familiarity, F(2,70) = 131.229, p < .001. Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that there was a significant difference 
between each pair of familiarity levels. Likelihood of experiencing a FOK increased 
from an average of 15% for familiarity level 2 to 51% for familiarity level 3 (p < 
.001) and then increased from 51% for familiarity level 3 to 88% for familiarity level 
4 (p < .001).  
 
In order to assess the effect of semantic retrieval on likelihood of experiencing 
a FOK, a within-subjects ANOVA was performed. In this ANOVA, FOKs were 
considered separately to TOTs, thus TOT were excluded from the data. The levels of 
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semantic retrieval were; none, weak and strong. There was a statistically significant 
difference in likelihood of experiencing a FOK for the three semantic levels,     
F(2,54) = 8.644, p < .001. Post hoc tests were carried out using Bonferroni correction 
and revealed that there was no significant difference between average percent 
likelihood of experiencing a FOK for weak semantic retrieval and strong semantic 
retrieval (p > .05); with only an increase from 47% for weak semantic to 53% for 
strong semantic. There was a significant difference between all other pairwise 
comparisons (p <. 05), with an increase from an average of 25% for no semantic 
retrieval.  
 
In order to assess the effect of semantic retrieval on likelihood of experiencing 
a FOK, a within-subjects ANOVA was performed. In this ANOVA, FOKs and TOTs 
were not considered as two separate phenomena, thus TOTs were included in the data. 
The levels of semantic retrieval were; none, weak and strong. There was a statistically 
significant difference in likelihood of experiencing a FOK for the three semantic 
levels, F(2,54) = 52.240, p < .001.  Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that there was a significant difference between each pair of semantic levels. 
Likelihood of experiencing a FOK increased from an average of 7% for no semantic 
retrieval to 38% for weak semantic retrieval (p < .001) and then increased from 38% 
to 67% for strong semantic retrieval (p < .001). 
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Recognition accuracy t-tests 
To determine whether there was a difference in performance on the 
recognition test for FOKs and for non-FOKs, a series of analyses were carried out.    3 
x 2 ANOVAs were attempted but due to insufficient data points (as data had to be 
discarded when subjects did not experience all of the states it left only 4 subjects who 
experienced all 6 of the states) t-tests were carried out. 
 
Including TOTs (familiarity) 
In the following t-tests, FOKs and TOTs were not considered as two separate 
phenomena, thus TOTs were included in the data. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 2 familiarity. There 
was not a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                         
(M = .596, SD = .379) and non-FOK (M = .485, SD = .245) whilst in level 2 
familiarity; t(20) = 1.188, p > .05. This result provides no support for the notion that 
FOKs are associated with higher recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 3 familiarity. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                               
(M = .779, SD = .274) and non-FOK  (M = .361, SD = .365) whilst in level 3 
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familiarity; t(28) = 6.316, p < .001. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK 
leads to better recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 4 familiarity. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                               
(M = .792, SD = .229) and non-FOK (M = .566, SD = .405) whilst in level 4 
familiarity; t(19) = 2.799, p < .05. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads 
to better recognition accuracy. 
 
Excluding TOTs (familiarity) 
In the following t-tests, FOKs and TOTs were considered as two separate 
phenomena, thus TOTs were excluded from the data. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 2 familiarity. There 
was not a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                         
(M = .623, SD = .397) and non-FOK (M = .495, SD = .261) whilst in level 2 
familiarity; t(20) = 1.323, p > .05. This result provides no support for the notion that 
experiencing a FOK leads to better recognition accuracy. 
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A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 3 familiarity. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                
(M = .756, SD = .293) and non-FOK (M = .339, SD = .346) whilst in level 3 
familiarity; t(25) = 5.077, p < .001. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK 
leads to better recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects were experiencing level 4 familiarity. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                
(M = .779, SD = .327) and non-FOK (M = .5, SD = .0) whilst in level 4 familiarity; 
t(14) = 3.303, p < .01. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to better 
recognition accuracy. 
 
Including TOTs (semantic retrieval) 
In the following t-tests, FOKs and TOTs were not considered as two separate 
phenomena, thus TOTs were included in the data. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved no semantic information. There was 
a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                      
(M = .727, SD = .360) and non-FOK (M = .481, SD = .252) for no semantic retrieval; 
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t(26) = 3.541, p < .01. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to better 
recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved weak semantic information. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                
(M = .800, SD = .244) and non-FOK (M = .502, SD = .351) for weak semantic 
retrieval; t(26) = 4.150, p < .001. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads 
to better recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved strong semantic information. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                
(M = .824, SD= .186) and non-FOK (M = .501, SD = .381) for no semantic retrieval; 
t(24) = 4.287, p < .001. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to better 
recognition accuracy. 
 
Excluding TOTs (semantic retrieval) 
In the following t-tests, FOKs and TOTs were considered as two separate 
phenomena, thus TOTs were excluded from the data. 
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A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved no semantic information. There was 
a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                      
(M = .679, SD = .394) and non-FOK (M = .457, SD = .237) for no semantic retrieval; 
t(25) = 3.029, p < .01. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to better 
recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved weak semantic information. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                               
(M = .747, SD = .369) and non-FOK (M = .505, SD = .342) for weak semantic 
retrieval; t(23) = 2.799, p < .05. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to 
better recognition accuracy. 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare recognition accuracy in 
FOKs and in non-FOKs, whilst subjects retrieved strong semantic information. There 
was a significant difference in the recognition accuracy for FOK                                
(M = .794, SD = .289) and non-FOK (M = .485, SD = .400) for strong semantic 
retrieval; t(20) = 2.833, p < .05. This result suggests that experiencing a FOK leads to 
better recognition accuracy. 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
 The aim of this study was to assess the validity of the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis and the target-accessibility hypothesis for explaining the bases of FOKs 
for the names of faces. Furthermore, this study also aimed to assess expanded 
hypotheses, such as dual-models (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001, and Sun et al., 2014) 
and the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis (Brewer et al., 2010). We explored the 
contribution of recalled semantic information and cue-familiarity in a paradigm that 
allowed us to assess the level of both of these variables. Both the bases of FOKs and 
the accuracy of FOKs and non-FOKs, as defined by the differing levels of cue-
familiarity and semantic information, were assessed. 
 
 Previous research in this area for FOKs relating to names of famous faces 
favoured the cue-familiarity hypothesis (Hosey et al., 2009); suggesting that FOKs are 
based mainly on the familiarity of the cue. However, research by Batchelor (2014) 
was not consistent with the cue-familiarity hypothesis. The results revealed that when 
participants found the face familiar-only they were not always experiencing a FOK; in 
fact, they were more likely to experience a non-FOK than a FOK. However, because 
the Batchelor (2014) study did not assess the levels of familiarity, it was speculated 
that FOKs could be based on a specific level of familiarity; i.e. a certain threshold of 
familiarity is required before a FOK can be experienced. Therefore, this current study 
aimed to assess different levels of cue-familiarity to determine if an increase in cue-
familiarity would affect the FOK. It was then possible to determine whether 
familiarity needed to reach a certain threshold before a FOK would be experienced, or 
whether familiarity with the face, at any level, has no impact on eliciting a FOK.  
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 The results found that greater levels of cue-familiarity increased the likelihood 
of experiencing a FOK. This was true when TOTs were considered as FOKs (TOTs 
included in the analysis) or as separate phenomena (TOTs excluded from the 
analysis). The results showed that the likelihood of experiencing a FOK increased 
significantly between each familiarity level. This suggests that as familiarity 
increases, the likelihood of experiencing a FOK increases. These results are consistent 
with the cue-familiarity hypothesis, which suggests that FOKs are based on 
familiarity with the cue. These results are also consistent with the research by Hosey 
et al., (2009) which conclude that cue-familiarity is responsible for FOKs for names 
of faces. The idea of a threshold of cue-familiarity that needs to be met before a FOK 
can be experienced, as suggested following the Batchelor (2014) study, has not been 
supported. This is because FOKs were experienced during all levels of cue-
familiarity; weak, moderate and strong. What can be concluded is that as level of cue-
familiarity increases so does the likelihood of experiencing a FOK. 
 
Although the results from the analyses of this study provide general support 
for the cue-familiarity hypothesis, there are still FOKs that are not accounted for by 
the hypothesis. Even when participants found the face highly familiar it did not 
always lead to a FOK and this is problematic for the cue-familiarity hypothesis. 
Therefore, it could be speculated that FOKs are not entirely based on familiarity. It 
could be speculated that some FOKs are based on familiarity whilst other FOKs are 
based on another factor. Alternatively, FOKs could be based on a different factor 
entirely and familiarity is merely correlated with it.  
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 It could be considered that experiencing a FOK causes participants to select 
higher levels of familiarity. A FOK may not be the result of experiencing a level 4 
familiarity, perhaps a level 4 familiarity is merely being selected because the 
participant is experiencing a FOK. Consider that a feeling of high familiarity or 
warmth could sometimes be a by-product of experiencing a FOK, thus high 
familiarity levels may just sometimes co-exist with FOKs, as opposed to causing 
FOKs. Alternatively, perhaps participants may feel as though they should select 
higher levels of familiarity when they are indicating a FOK; a result of demand 
characteristics. It is as if participants could be experiencing a FOK and feel as though 
they need to justify their reasons (in a lab setting) for indicating a FOK; therefore, 
they indicate high familiarity more often than lower levels of familiarity. 
Furthermore, consider the direct-access theory. If individuals had privileged access to 
unrecalled target answers, through memory traces, the finding that FOKs are more 
likely to occur than non-FOKs when cue-familiarity is high does not contradict the 
trace-access theory. If the name of a person is stored within memory, it is more likely 
that the individual will experience familiarity for the face. Again, familiarity may just 
co-exist with FOKs because generally we only learn and store the names of people we 
have encountered before. 
 
Furthermore, even though the results have shown that greater familiarity with 
the face is more likely to lead to a FOK, cue-familiarity may play a secondary role in 
driving the process of a FOK rather than being the single determinant. Koriat and 
Levy-Sadot (2001) suggested, in their combined hypothesis, that familiarity may act 
as a gating mechanism. They suggested that familiarity must be strong enough to 
drive memory search before target-accessibility can come into play. A level of 
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familiarity could be acting as a trigger for the search-and-retrieval process which may 
occur before a FOK can be elicited. It could be that that as familiarity increases a 
FOK is more likely to be experienced simply because higher familiarity is more likely 
to drive the search-and-retrieval process than lower levels of familiarity. Therefore, it 
does not mean that familiarity itself is directly the primary basis of the FOK. If one 
were to assume that familiarity drives the search-and-retrieval process then the more 
familiar the participant finds the face, the greater the likelihood that the search-and-
retrieval process will be initiated. Thus, it increases the likelihood of (but does not 
directly cause) a FOK. Just because a FOK is more likely to occur with very high 
levels of familiarity, does not mean that the familiarity is causing the FOK, it may just 
co-exist as a gating mechanism. 
 
This study considered the possibility of the two hypotheses, cue-familiarity 
and target-accessibility, working together as two separate mechanisms (as proposed 
by Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001). To assess whether such a dual-model does play a 
role in the FOK experience, this study looked at whether a high familiarity combined 
with a strong amount of semantic information would lead to a FOK. However, high 
familiarity with retrieval of strong semantic information only led to 63% FOKs and 
38% non-FOKs; thus, the combination of both factors cannot account for FOKs.  
 
 However, something this study can conclude, regarding the relationship 
between cue-familiarity and the bases of FOKs, is that a FOK requires at least some 
degree of familiarity with a face. When participants found the face unfamiliar they 
never experienced a FOK. This finding is consistent with recent research (Sun et al., 
2014) that supports the dual-process hypothesis (Liu et al., 2007). The dual-process 
 57 
hypothesis suggests that FOK and non-FOK judgements belong to two dissociable 
cognitive processes; FOK judgements are based on the target-accessibility model, 
whereas non-FOK judgements are based on cue-familiarity. This model would predict 
that non-FOKs are a result of such judgements being based on the cue-familiarity, 
thus when there is no cue-familiarity a non-FOK will be automatically indicated by 
participants. The findings in this current study support this idea that the cue-
familiarity model may provide a better account for non-FOKs; because no familiarity 
or low familiarity results in non-FOKs. However, it must be noted that non-FOKs still 
occur even when familiarity is very high (38% of high familiarity responses for a face 
led to non-FOKs), so the cue-familiarity model for the bases of non-FOKs cannot 
explain all situations in which a non-FOK was the outcome. Again, cue-familiarity 
may be used as driving the search-and-retrieval process. When the face is unfamiliar 
or barely familiar, the search-and-retrieval process may not be initiated, thus eliciting 
a non-FOK. In conclusion, our results support the notion that there is a dual-process 
in terms of non-FOKs and FOKs possibly being based on two different cognitive 
processes.  
 
 This study also aimed to investigate the target-accessibility hypothesis. Koriat 
(1993) suggested that ‘FOK judgements monitor the mere amount of information 
accessible’ and that a participant must base their FOK on ‘the quantity and intensity 
of the information accessible’. Koriat (1993) suggests that FOKs are based on clues 
accumulated during the initial stages of search-and-retrieval, and that these ‘clues’ 
include ‘semantic attributes’. Koriat’s (1993) model would predict that the more 
semantic information retrieved pertaining to the target the more likely the individual 
is to experience a FOK. Therefore, level of retrieved semantic knowledge was 
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assessed to determine whether the ability to recall semantic information about the 
person (target) would cause participants to report a FOK.   
On this premise, we hypothesised that if participants recalled no semantic 
information, it would lead to a non-FOK. The greater the level of semantic 
information, the greater the likelihood of participants reporting a FOK. Previous 
research (Batchelor, 2014) revealed that the ability to recall semantic information did 
not cause participants to experience automatically a FOK. However, this previous 
research did not investigate the varying amounts of semantic information retrieved 
about a given target. Therefore, it could be suggested that a certain level of semantic 
information needs to be recalled before a FOK can be experienced; this current study 
investigated this. The amount of retrieved semantic knowledge was classified into 
three levels; none, weak and strong, to determine if the level of semantic knowledge 
had an effect on the FOK.  
 
 The results revealed that retrieving semantic information increased the 
likelihood of experiencing a FOK. This was true for when TOTs and FOKs were 
considered as either the same phenomena (TOTs included in the analysis) or as 
separate phenomena (TOTs excluded from the analysis). When TOTs were included 
in the analysis, the results showed that the likelihood of experiencing a FOK, rather 
than a non-FOK, was significantly different for each of the semantic levels; 
participants experienced more FOKs when achieving greater semantic retrieval. 
However, when TOTs were excluded from the analysis, and therefore FOKs were 
considered as a separate phenomenon to TOTs, there was not a significant difference 
between the likelihood of experiencing a FOK for weak semantic retrieval and for 
strong semantic retrieval. This result suggests that retrieving greater semantic 
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information does not have an impact on the likelihood of the participant experiencing 
a FOK. This result is not consistent with the target-accessibility hypothesis (Koriat, 
1993) and opposes Koriat’s suggestion that greater quantities and intensities of 
information accumulated during the initial stages of search-and-retrieval process will 
result in a FOK. There was, however, a significant difference between no semantic 
retrieval and both weak and strong semantic retrieval; suggesting that retrieving 
semantic information, whether weak or strong, will be more likely to lead to a FOK 
than retrieving no semantic information. 
 
 The results do not provide strong support for the target-accessibility theory. 
The theory would predict that as amount of semantic retrieval is increased the amount 
of FOKs reported would increase. However, the results of this study are not consistent 
with this trend; there was no significant difference in amount of FOKs reported 
between weak semantic and strong semantic retrieval (when FOKs were treated as a 
separate phenomenon to TOTs). This suggests that an increase in amount of semantic 
retrieval does not affect the likelihood of experiencing a FOK, which is problematic 
for the target-accessibility hypothesis. Although it is evident that receiving semantic 
information is more likely to lead to a FOK than receiving no semantic information at 
all. 
 
 It could be argued that the results partially support the target-accessibility 
hypothesis (Koriat, 1993) because the results reveal that participants always 
experience a FOK when they reported a TOT; as the target name feels accessible and 
participants are able to accumulate clues (i.e. structural clues, such as the first letter of 
the word). However, it can be argued that despite a FOK always being experienced 
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with a TOT, it may not be that partial activation of the name is responsible for causing 
the FOK. Instead, partial activation of the name may exist independently of the FOK 
and have nothing to do with causing the FOK; partial activation of the name and a 
FOK may be two separate independent components that are causing the TOT. 
Furthermore, the target-accessibility hypothesis does not account for all of the 
reported FOKs; as FOKs were also experienced when participants were not in a TOT 
state. This is further support for the notion that there is another factor that plays a role 
in causing a FOK, and that the target-accessibility model does not explain the bases of 
FOKs for names of faces. 
 
 The ability to retrieve semantic information may co-exist independently of the 
causation of a FOK. That is, whatever causes the FOK may exist with semantic 
information alongside it, without a causal relationship from the retrieval of semantic 
information to the report of a FOK. It is possible that semantic information is 
retrieved after the experience of a FOK; as a FOK is often considered to be a fast 
experience which occurs rapidly (Paynter, Reder & Kieffaber, 2008). Consider then 
that FOKs are not based on the amount of information retrieved, but that there is a 
possibility that target-accessibility instead plays a role in the magnitude of FOKs, 
rather than the bases. The more semantic information an individual can recall, the 
more likely they are to feel confident about the FOK judgement and perhaps then rate 
the judgement higher. The magnitude of the FOK is greater because the individuals 
can retrieve greater intensities/amounts of semantic information; this acts as a 
‘reassurance’ to the individual that their FOK is correct. This explanation accounts for 
results where retrieval of noncriterial information plays a role in the magnitude of 
FOKs, e.g. Brewer et al., (2010) and Schwartz at al. (2014). In these studies, the 
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results have not necessarily shown that retrieval of noncriterial information causes 
FOKs but that there is a relationship between retrieval of noncriterial information and 
the magnitude of FOKs. Therefore, future research could explore retrieval of semantic 
information in relation to the magnitude of FOKs. 
  
 Furthermore, this study aimed to investigate the accuracy of FOKs and non-
FOKs in predicting subsequent successful recognition of previously unrecalled target 
names. This was assessed using the RJR paradigm, in which participants were 
presented with a recognition task in the final phase of the study. Previous research has 
not explored the recognition accuracy of FOKs and non-FOKs defined by levels of 
cue-familiarity or by varying amounts of retrieved semantic information. 
 
FOKs whilst in a TOT state were good predictors of correct recognition with 
85% of TOTs leading to correct recognition (only 45% of non-FOKs led to correct 
recognition). This is consistent with previous research which shows that TOTs are 
good predictors of recognition (e.g. Schwartz, 2002). FOKs, with no TOT, were also 
good predictors of correct recognition (73% of FOKs led to correct recognition). 
Participants performed at above chance in the recognition task for both states. This 
outcome is consistent with Hart’s (1965) finding that FOKs are better predictors of 
recognition than non-FOKs.  
  
 The results revealed that when participants found the cue slightly familiar 
(level 2 familiarity), there was not a significant difference in recognition accuracy for 
FOKs and Non-FOKs. Participants were no more likely to perform correctly in the 
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recognition test when they were experiencing a FOK. This was true for when TOTs 
were included in the data and when TOTs were excluded from the data. 
 
 Furthermore, the results revealed that when participants found the cue 
moderately familiar (level 3 familiarity), there was a significant difference in 
recognition accuracy; participants performed better on the recognition test if they 
were experiencing a FOK. This was true for when TOTs were included in the data 
and when TOTs were excluded in the data. 
 
 The results also revealed that when participants found the cue highly familiar 
(level 4 familiarity), there was a significant difference in recognition accuracy; 
participants performed better on the recognition test if they were experiencing a FOK. 
This was true for when TOTs were included in the data and when TOTs were 
excluded in the data. 
 
 These results regarding familiarity level and recognition accuracy, suggest that 
participants perform better on the recognition test when they are experiencing a FOK; 
this is only true when familiarity reaches level 3. FOKs experienced with level 2 
familiarity are no more likely to lead to better recognition than non-FOKs. Therefore, 
the best predictors of correct recognition are FOKs with moderate or high cue-
familiarity. These results suggest that FOKs are only accurate predictors of correct 
recognition when experienced alongside specific levels of cue-familiarity. 
 
It was expected that the higher the familiarity with the face, the greater the 
chances that the face was genuinely well-known to the participant and that the 
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participant would have known the name and have been more likely to recognise the 
target name. In line with the cue-familiarity hypothesis, which states that any factor 
which increases the familiarity of the cue will simultaneously increase the magnitude 
of the FOK (Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993), it was hypothesised that if this 
theory were correct then an increase in cue-familiarity would positively affect the 
accuracy of the FOK. The results are consistent with this theory. 
 
 The results revealed that experiencing a FOK lead to better recognition 
accuracy than experiencing a non-FOK, for each level of semantic retrieval. FOKs 
were better predictors of correct recognition (than non-FOKs) when participants 
retrieved no semantic information, weak semantic information, or strong semantic 
information. This was true for when TOTs were included in the data and when TOTs 
were excluded in the data. 
 
 The results show that FOKs, with any level of semantic retrieval (whether 
none, weak or strong), were more likely to lead to correct recognition than incorrect 
recognition; demonstrating that FOKs are accurate predictors of behaviour in the 
sense that they are more likely to lead to correct recognition rather than incorrect 
recognition. Thus, the results indicate that a FOK is an authentic state/experience and 
affects behaviour in terms of recognition performance, regardless of the level of 
semantic retrieval. 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study have not provided strong support for the 
target-accessibility hypothesis (Koriat, 1993) nor the expanded hypothesis (the dual-
model, Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001); suggesting that FOKs are not based on the 
amount of accessed semantic information. The results have provided general support 
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for the cue-familiarity hypothesis (e.g. Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992), thus, offering 
support for previous research on FOKs for famous faces (Hosey at al., 2009). The 
results have shown that increasing cue-familiarity will increase the number of FOKs 
reported, however, even high familiarity lead to 38% non-FOKs which is problematic 
for the cue-familiarity hypothesis; although it is possible that this may include some 
cases of familiar faces whose names are unknown (as discussed in the Introduction to 
this chapter). When assessing the effect cue-familiarity has on accuracy of FOKs, the 
best predictors of subsequent recognition are FOKs with moderate to high familiarity. 
FOKs experienced with low cue-familiarity were not accurate predictors of correct 
recognition. The accuracy of FOKs experienced for each level of semantic retrieval 
were also assessed and revealed that, regardless of semantic level, FOKs were more 
likely to lead to correct recognition that incorrect recognition. 
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Chapter 3: Electrodermal activity for metamemory judgements in response to 
names of faces  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Electrodermal activity (EDA) is a method of psychophysiological recording 
which measures changes in the electrical activity of palmar and plantar skin 
(Boucsein et al., 2012). EDA is an umbrella term which encompasses various 
measures. As the skin possesses electric properties which are known to change on a 
short time scale of seconds and are closely related to psychological processes, EDA is 
a method which measures changes in the skin’s conductance and is a useful tool for 
measuring affective processes (Figner & Murphy, 2011).  
 
Changes in EDA are related to changes in sweating from the eccrine sweat 
glands; which are the major sweat glands of the human body (Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 
2000). The eccrine sweat glands are in highest density in the palms and the soles, thus 
why EDA measurements are usually taken from these locations (Stern, Ray, & 
Quigley, 2000). The eccrine glands secrete sweat, and it is the sweat which is an 
electrolyte solution. Thus, the more the skin sweats the more conductive the skin 
becomes. Changes in the sweating of the eccrine glands is controlled by the 
sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) (Figner & Murphy, 
2011). And it is the arousal of the sympathetic ANS which accompanies various 
different psychological processes. Thus, EDA measurements can be used to measure 
psychological processes which are related to sympathetic arousal (Figner & Murphy, 
2011). 
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This current study focuses on a measurement of EDA known as skin 
conductance response (SCR). SCR is the main indicator of phasic changes and is 
better suited for the nature of this current study due to its relatedness to specific 
events (such as experiencing different metamemory states) and because it can be 
operationalised across shorter time intervals than skin conductance levels (SCL) 
(Figner & Murphy, 2011). SCR is most often used as an indicator of affective 
processes; it indexes the intensity of arousal (Figner & Murphy, 2011). SCR is often 
used as an indirect measure of attention, cognitive effort, or emotional arousal 
(Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, Dolan, 2000). As SCR is a multifaceted phenomenon and 
does not reflect just one single psychological process, it has been deemed a useful 
method for a range of research in psychology and related disciplines.  
 
SCR has been used in a wide variety of research, including; covert recognition 
in developmental prosopagnosia (Bate & Cook, 2012), pain assessment in premature 
newborn babies (Munsters, Wallstrom, Argen, Norsted & Sindelar, 2012), in panic 
disorder (Doberenz, Roth, Wollburg, Breuninger and Kim, 2010), as a measure of 
schizotypy and psychopathy (Ragsdale, Mitchell, Cassisi & Bedwell, 2013), as a trait 
marker for suicidal propensity in depression (Thorell et al., 2013), in decision-making 
research (e.g. Crone, Somsen. Been & Van Der Molden, 2004; Crone & van der 
Molen, 2007), in sexual decision-making in males (Spokes, Hine, Marks, Quain & 
Lykins, 2014), and in research into mindfulness (Delgado-Pastor et al., 2015).  
 
Despite the wide use of SCR as a tool in various areas of research, to date 
there is no such research into SCR and metamemory. However, there has been 
research into SCR and various types of memory. For example, one study by 
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Cunningham et al., (2014), investigated psychophysiological arousal (SCR and heart 
rate) for emotional memory following sleep. A study by Rothen and Meier (2014) 
looked into SCRs and prospective memory, whilst Holper, Jäger, Scholkmann and 
Wolf (2013) investigated SCR for memory during spatial navigation. But, to date, no 
research has considered SCR and metamemory. 
 
One study, by Kikyo and Miyashita (2004), investigated the neural correlates 
of the FOK induced by face-name associations. In this study, they used event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) whilst using the RJR paradigm. 
Participants ranked their degree of FOK from 1-6. But, level of familiarity with the 
face and amount of semantic information recalled about the individual, was not 
measured. As the main objective of this study was to look at neural correlates of the 
FOK, the study revealed the brain regions which were active during a FOK, but did 
not look at neural differences between different states (non-FOKs, FOKs, TOTs). 
 
This current study aims to investigate SCR whilst individuals experience 
various metamemory states. SCR is a valuable psychophysiological tool which would 
allow us to investigate psychological arousal in relation to metamemory. However, 
there are also suggestions in the literature that implicitly relate SCR to metamemory. 
It has been shown than the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is linked to SCR. 
One study by Zhang et al., (2014) investigated this link between the vmPFC by 
looking at causality between cerebral blood oxygenation level-dependent and SCR in 
participants whom were taking part in a cognitive task during a fMRI. Their results 
found that increased activity in the vmPFC caused a decrease in SCR. Other research 
has also shown that the vmPFC plays a dominant role in skin conductance (Patterson, 
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Ungerleider & Bandettini, 2002). Patterson, Ungerleider and Bandettini’s (2002) 
results revealed that brain activity in the vmPFC area correlated with changes in SCR 
and was activated independent of the participant’s cognitive state. Furthermore, 
research has shown that when the vmPFC has lesions, patients experience a loss of 
SCR (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996).  
 
The literature also shows a link between the prefrontal cortex and FOK 
judgements. For example, Modirrusta and Fellows (2008) found that the medial 
prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in FOK judgments. Schneyer, Nicholls and 
Verfaellie (2005) also showed that the vmPFC is engaged whilst accurate FOK 
judgements are made. Damage to the vmPFC has also been associated with impaired 
FOK accuracy. A study on patients with frontal lesions revealed that the vmPFC plays 
a critical role in FOK judgements and that damage to this area causes impaired FOK 
judgements (Schnyer et al., 2004).  
 
In summary, the research has shown that the vmPFC plays a role in SCR and 
that damage to this same area causes impaired FOK judgements. It could be 
speculated that these findings are linked and that there is a causal link between SCR 
and FOK judgements; high SCR when viewing a face could lead to a FOK. Thus, the 
emotional value attached to the cue (the face) could play a role in causing a FOK.  
Therefore, exploring a relationship between SCR and FOK judgements seems valid. 
 
This current study is interested in psychological arousal during the different 
metamemory states; non-FOKs, FOKs and TOTs. As SCR reflects psychological 
processes, as previously discussed, it should be an effective tool to understand if there 
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are differences in intensity of psychological arousal during each of these states. This 
study is interested in comparing the SCRs for TOTs, FOKs, and non-FOKs, whilst 
defining each state by a level of familiarity. As the results of study 1 did not provide 
strong support of the target-accessibility hypothesis, this study will only explore the 
cue-familiarity hypothesis. We have therefore chosen to focus on four levels of cue-
familiarity; not at all familiar, slightly familiar, moderately familiar and extremely 
familiar. This study is particularly interested in the comparison between psychological 
arousal of FOKs and non-FOKs with the same level of familiarity. If there is greater 
skin conductance response for FOKs than there is for non-FOKs (in which 
participants indicate a level of familiarity) then we can infer that there is something 
more to a FOK than merely familiarity; as greater SCR for FOKs than non-FOKs 
would reflect a greater intensity of psychological arousal.  
 
If the results do indeed reveal that SCR differs between these two states then it 
will provide support against the cue-familiarity hypothesis and suggest that FOKs are 
merely an evaluation of familiarity with the cue. This is because it would demonstrate 
that there is more to a FOK than just familiarity, and that a greater psychological 
arousal is experienced when a FOK occurs than when a non-FOK occurs with the 
same level of familiarity. 
 
Previous research (Tranel, Fowles & Damasio, 1985) has shown that 
participants have a greater SCR when viewing familiar faces than they have when 
viewing unfamiliar faces, even in patients who show no covert recognition. Therefore, 
we hypothesise that there should be a difference in SCR between faces which 
participants indicate as familiar and faces which participants indicate as unfamiliar. 
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Furthermore, the state which we expect to show greatest SCR is the TOT state, due to 
the emotive affect this state is suggested to cause (Brown, 2012). 
 
As Experiment 2 was designed to investigate possible differences in 
metacognitive states as detected by SCR, it was not an exact replication of 
Experiment 1.  Experiment 2 did not measure levels of target-accessibility and also 
differed in the questions asked of participants.  Therefore, the full range of analyses 
conducted on the results of Experiment 1 was not appropriate for Experiment 2. 
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3.2 Method 
Participants: 63 participants were tested individually. Two participants were 
excluded for interrupting the recording and one participant was excluded because the 
equipment did not record properly. The mean age of participants was 26 years (25 
females and 35 males). 
 
Design: The study used a within-subjects design. The dependent variable was 
the responses to each face.  
 
 Apparatus: The experiment was run with SuperLab. The stimuli were 
presented on an Apple iMac; 27” screen.  The SCR data was collected using 
electrodes which were connected to a Cendrus RB-834 Response Pad and Nexus-10, 
connected to a Dell Latitude E4310 laptop computer. The recordings were recorded 
using the software; BioTrace+ V2013. The site for electrodes was prepared using 
alcohol prep pads (saturated with 70% isopropyl alcohol) and Ten20 conductive 
paste. 
 
Materials: 54 images of celebrity faces (27 female and 27 male) were used in 
both the recall and recognition phase (see appendix for sample materials). The images 
were obtained online and cropped so that each image was a uniform size. The 
celebrity faces ranged in terms of occupation of the person (e.g. actors, comedians, 
sportsmen).  All images were frontal shots, with happy expressions to minimise any 
effect that other expressions may have on participant’s SCR. 
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In the recall phase, for each face, participants were presented with questions. 
The questions were (in the given order):  ‘Do you have a feeling of knowing; would 
you be able to select the correct name from a list of four names?’ (the response 
options were: ‘yes’ or ‘no’), ‘does this face look familiar to you?’ (with the following 
options: not at all familiar, slightly familiar, moderately familiar, extremely familiar), 
and ‘are you in a tip of the tongue state?’ (the response options were: ‘yes’ or ‘no’). 
 
In the recognition phase, participants were presented with a multiple-choice 
test consisting of four names for each given face. The correct name was presented 
within the list in a random order. The other three names consisted of other celebrities 
who were the same gender, of the same occupation and who had names of the same 
ethnic origin as the target name. 
 
Procedure: Participants were made aware that they would have two electrodes 
attached to two of their fingers on the hand which they do not type or use the mouse 
with. Participants were seated in front of the screen and participant’s distal phalanges 
of their index and third finger were wiped with alcohol prep pads to remove any 
residue or oil on the fingers. After allowing the alcohol wipe to briefly dry, electrode 
gel was then applied to the same two fingers before two electrodes were then attached 
to the fingers. The opposite hand to which participants use to type or use the mouse 
with was used. Participants were supplied with a cushion to rest their hand/forearm 
on.  
Each participant was instructed to take a deep breath to check for sufficient 
gain in SCR. Skin conductance measurements were taken continuously during the 5-
min baseline whilst participants were presented with the general instructions. The 
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instructions informed participants that the experiment consisted of fifty-four faces in 
which they were to answer the given questions as honestly as possible. Participants 
were instructed not to move their hand with the electrodes throughout the duration of 
the study and to keep other body movements to a minimum; including avoiding deep 
breathes or sighs. The participants were also given a sheet of paper with the definition 
of a TOT state and a FOK, and participants were made aware that they should refer to 
this definition if they were to forget it at any point throughout the duration of the 
study. A TOT state was defined as follows: ‘the feeling that you know the name and 
that recall is imminent (likely to occur at any moment)’. A FOK was defined as 
follows: ‘you feel as though you know the name and you would be able to select the 
correct name from a list of names. You may not be able to recall the name 
imminently, but you feel as though you do know the name. The name is within your 
memory’. 
 
Firstly, in the recall phase, participants were shown a photo of a face and 
asked to give the name of the celebrity. If they could recall the name they typed the 
name into the text box. If participants were unable to recall the name, they were 
required to hit the ‘/’ key on their keyboard, which was labelled with a brightly 
coloured star to make it distinctive. Once they had done this, participants were 
required to click ‘next’. They were then presented with the three questions, whilst an 
image of the face still remained on the screen. Participants were required to answer all 
of the questions by clicking answers with the mouse. Once all questions were 
answered participants proceeded to the next face. Participants were required to 
respond to all fifty-four faces in the recall phase before proceeding to the recognition 
phase. 
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In the recognition phase, participants were told they would be given a 
multiple-choice test and were instructed to select the correct name from a list of four 
names, for each face. Participants were made aware that they must select a name for 
each face. The participants were shown the same fifty-four faces on the screen, one at 
a time, along with four names to select from. During the multiple-choice test, 
participants were told that they could now relax their hand as SCR was no longer 
going to be recorded. 
 
Throughout the experiment all participants were tested individually and were 
able to view each face and work through the questions at their own pace. Participants 
were not permitted to go back to a face or previous questions if they had already 
completed them.   
 
Measurement  
An individual SCR refers to a peak in skin conductance, and is described as “a 
discrete and short fluctuation in skin conductance that lasts several seconds and 
usually follows a characteristic pattern of an initial, relatively steep rise, a short peak, 
and then a relatively slower return to baseline” (Figner & Murphy, 2001, p.165). In 
other words, SCR is measuring the phasic change in electrical conductivity of skin. In 
this study, SCR was recorded in Biotrace. Because we wanted to measure event-
related SCRs (SCR in relation to individual faces), markers/triggers were used. A new 
marker was used to signal when a new face (along with it's given questions) were 
presented to the participant. This allowed the SCR to be recorded with markers which 
indicated when a new face was being presented, and another marker to indicate when 
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participants had completed the questions for this given face, so that the SCR data 
could be considered individually for each face. The SCR was recoded from the exact 
moment that the participant was shown the face and during the behavioural measures 
(whilst the participant was answering the given questions). SCR was not recorded 
during the second part of the experiment; the recall phase. 
 
Data handling 
The SCR data collected via BioTrace were analysed by importing the raw skin 
conductance signal (which was measured in microSiemen) into a specialist software 
Ledalab, which is built in MatLab. Ledalab can perform event-related analysis 
relative to the event markers (the markers were used to flag the event of a new face 
being presented to participants). The method of EDA analysis which was used was 
The Continuous Decomposition Analysis (CDA), which performs decomposition of 
the data into continuous signals of phasic and tonic activity and is the most 
appropriate analysis for analysing data relative to event markers. The analysis for 
each participant was optimised, an option in Ledalab, which applies the most 
appropriate parameters in the decomposition window. The SCR data were then 
collated with the data from the task (the participant's responses to the questions). 
 
3.3 Results 
The task data were coded so that each state (non-FOK, FOK, TOT) which was 
indicated during the recall phase could be identified. The means (maximum 54) and 
standard deviations are displayed in table 2. The SCR for each state during varying 
levels of cue-familiarity could then be identified. 
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A series of between subjects one-way ANOVAs were conducted to compare 
the difference in SCR for the different metacognitive states (non-FOK, FOK and 
TOT) and for the different levels of cue-familiarity, to determine whether 
metacognitive state or cue-familiarity level has an effect on SCR. 
 
A between subjects one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
metacognitive state on SCR, for the occasion on which participants found the face 
slightly familiar (familiarity level 2). There was no statistically significant difference 
in SCR between the familiarity levels (F(2,99) = .455, p > .05).  
 
A between subjects one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
metacognitive state on SCR, for the times in which participants found the face 
moderately familiar (familiarity level 3). There was no statistically significant 
difference in SCR between the familiarity levels (F(2,110) = .023, p > .05).  
 
A between subjects one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
metacognitive state on SCR, for the times in which participants found the face highly 
familiar (familiarity level 4). There was no statistically significant difference in SCR 
between the familiarity levels (F(2, 97) = .241, p > .05).  
 
Table 2: Means (SDs) for responses during the recall phase. 
     
       TOT 
 
FOK 
 
Non-FOK 
 
Face 
Unknown 
 
Named during 
recall 
4.97 (3.24) 13.9 (6.48) 14.53 (10.03) 17.1 (8.46) 4.5 (5.27) 
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A between subjects one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
cue-familiarity level on SCR, to determine whether familiarity with a face has an 
effect on SCR, regardless of metacognitive state. There was no statistically significant 
difference in SCR between the familiarity levels (F(3,222) = .142, p > .05). 
 
These analyses provide no evidence that SCR as measured in this Experiment 
differs according to the metacognitive states participants report.  There were no 
significant differences between TOT, FOK and Non-FOK states for any level of 
familiarity.   
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3.4 Discussion  
This current study aimed to investigate SCR whilst participants experienced 
various metamemory states. There has been a wealth of previous research 
investigating SCR, and also a wealth of research investigating metamemory. 
However, no such research has combined the two and investigated SCR for 
metamemory judgements. In particular, this study was interested in SCR when 
participants experienced a FOK. Research into FOKs has been concerned with the 
accuracy of FOKs (Hart, 1965; Nelson, Gerler & Narens, 1984; Perrotin, Bellevill & 
Isinggrini, 2007; Mathilde Sacher, Isingrini & Taconnat, 2013) and the bases of FOKs 
(Schwartz & Melcafe, 1992; Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993; Koriat, 1993). 
However, previous research into FOKs has not explored psychophysiological 
measures of the FOK, nor considered the possibility that greater psychophysiological 
arousal may play a role in eliciting FOKs. 
 
This current study aimed to investigate possible differences in SCR levels for 
each metamemory state (non-FOK, FOK, TOT). The aim was to determine whether 
participants experienced increased SCR whilst making metamemory judgments, with 
particular interest in the FOK judgement. Participants were required to view faces 
and, using the RJR paradigm (developed by Hart, 1965), indicate which state they 
were experiencing (non-FOK, FOK, or TOT). However, the results did not reveal a 
significant difference in SCR between the states, suggesting that there is no difference 
in intensity of physiological arousal between any of the states. When participants felt 
as though they would be able to recognise the name of the face (FOK), or when they 
felt as though the name was imminent and they were about to recall the name (TOT), 
it caused no increase in psychological arousal as compared to when participants felt as 
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though they would not be able to recognise the name of a face they found familiar 
(non-FOK). This was a somewhat surprising result that even a TOT did not elicit 
higher SCR, as it is often thought that the TOT experience is a rather frustrating 
experience; with some researchers describing the TOT experience as a torment or 
agony (Brown & McNeill, 1966) and suggesting that an affective reaction is either a 
central part of the TOT experience of at least a by-product of the experience 
(Gruneberg, Smith & Winfrow; 1973; Yarmey, 1973; cited in Brown, 2012). 
Therefore, if any state were to cause greater SCR, it would have been expected that 
the TOT experience would be the most likely to do so. However, as already stated, 
this was not the case and the results revealed no difference in SCR between any of the 
states. 
 
This current study was also concerned with the level of cue-familiarity in 
which each state was experienced in. The study focussed on determining the level of 
cue-familiarity in which participants indicated whilst experiencing each of the states, 
with an aim to compare the SCR for these. Participants were required to rate the 
familiarity of each face on a four-point scale, from unfamiliar to highly familiar, in 
order to determine whether different levels of familiarity would result in a difference 
in SCR. In particular, this study was interested in looking at the difference in SCR 
between the levels of cue-familiarity for FOK judgements; to determine whether 
FOKs experienced during higher levels of familiarity result in higher levels of 
psychological arousal, or whether all FOKs, no matter what level of familiarity, 
would result in the same level of arousal. The results revealed that there was no 
significant difference in SCR between cue-familiarity levels. There was no difference 
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in SCR between the four levels of familiarity; unfamiliar, slightly familiar, 
moderately familiar, and highly familiar, for all of the states. 
 
It was expected that there would be a difference in SCR between faces which 
were found familiar, and faces which were found unfamiliar, as this is something 
which is widely accepted in SCR research (e.g. Tranel, Fowles & Damasio, 1985). 
However, as previously stated, this was not the case and the results revealed that there 
was no significant difference in SCR between any of the familiarity levels.  
 
In a study by Sherer and Mikulka (1996), the effect of facial familiarity and 
task requirement on electrodermal activity was investigated. Sherer and Mikulka 
(1996) assert that faces are arousing stimuli, whether this be from an innate attraction 
towards faces or from prior association of a face with an emotional event in one’s life. 
Following on from the findings of Tranel et al. (1985) which found that familiar faces 
elicit larger EDA responses than those of unfamiliar faces, Sherer and Mikulka (1996) 
re-examined this effect. 
 
Whereas, Tranel et al. (1985) merely asked participants to view faces, with no 
other task requirements or response requirements, Sherer and Mikulka (1996) 
manipulated the task requirement. Their participants were divided into two groups; a 
control group, who were asked to rate the attractiveness of the faces, and an 
experimental group who were asked to name the faces. It was expected that in the 
control group, where participants were required to judge the attractiveness of each 
face, it would divert the participant's attention from trying to name the faces. The aim 
of the study was to look at the automatic electrodermal response to the faces and to 
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look at the effect of EDA responses from the subsequent processing which is used to 
retrieve the identify-specific information about the face. 
 
Sherer and Mikulka’s (1996) results revealed that task requirement interacted 
with face familiarity to affect the magnitude of EDA response. Greater EDA occurred 
when participants were required to name the familiar face. However, whether a face 
was familiar or not, EDA did not vary for those participants who were busy rating 
facial attractiveness. Sherer and Milulka (1996) conclude that their findings show that 
familiar faces do not evoke an automatic increase in arousal, but that the context of 
the specific task is important. When the individual is required to retrieve information, 
such as identity-specific information, the arousal when presented with a familiar face 
is increased. The presentation of a familiar face, when the participant is not required 
to give any identify-specific information (such as rating facial attractiveness) does not 
produce this increase in arousal, thus no increase in EDA. This result contrasts to that 
of previous research (Tranel et al., 1985) that suggested that merely the presentation 
of a familiar face would automatically cause an increase in EDA. Sherer and Mikulka 
(1996) argue that their results were not due to participants in the control group not 
paying attention to the stimuli as participants did have to attend to the faces in order 
to make attractiveness ratings. They also explored the idea that the task of rating 
facial attractiveness was too simple thus bored the participants. However, they point 
out that in the Tranel et al. (1985) study participants had no task requirement at all. 
Thus, boredom and therefore lack of arousal through the task requirements, could not 
explain the results. Sherer and Mikulka (1996) go on to suggest that because the 
participants in the Tranel et al. (1985) study had no task requirements, their 
participants were attempting to identify the faces, without covertly stating this. Thus, 
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this may have been what caused their finding of greater EDA in response to familiar 
faces. Furthermore, they suggest that the novelty of the faces used in the Tranel et al., 
(1985) study may have been a major factor in the increased arousal that their study 
found (only 8 out of the 50 faces were familiar, the rest were novel). 
 
As Sherer and Mikulka (1996) suggested, minimal task requirements have 
been suggested to reduce arousal, thus reduce EDA (including studies such as; 
Germana (1968); Lieblick (1969); Ohman (1979), as cited in Sherer & Mikulka, 
1996). In this current study, it cannot be claimed that minimal task requirements are 
responsible for the lack of variety in EDA responses, as the study contained several 
task requirements from participants. Furthermore, inattention cannot be suggested to 
be responsible for the results. Because, just as in the Sherer and Mikulka (1996) 
study, participants had to attend to the faces to be able to fulfil the task requirements 
i.e. to be able to attempt to name the face, or to be able to rank the familiarity of the 
face. 
 
However, unlike the suggestion that minimal task requirements reduce 
arousal, perhaps the results of this study reflect the opposite. It may be the case that 
instead of the task requirements being too minimal, the task requirements may have 
been too high and this is what led to familiar and unfamiliar faces evoking the same 
level of SCR. It could be that the task requirements in this current study have 
influenced any SCR differences that would otherwise have been observed. The 
activity of the search-and-retrieval process (attempting to retrieve a name from 
memory), making a familiarity judgement, a FOK judgement, and a TOT judgement, 
may have caused a high level of cognitive demand. Previous research on EDA and 
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facial familiarity, used far less task requirements (i.e. Tranel et al., 1985). Thus, this 
may explain why the results of this current study do not show any difference in EDA 
between familiar and unfamiliar faces, let alone a difference in EDA between the 
different states or different levels of familiarity. It has also been shown that cognitive 
processes influence electrodermal activity, even merely anticipating a higher level of 
cognitive demand has been shown to cause anticipatory SCRs (Botvinivk & Rosen, 
2009). Therefore, it could be speculated that in order to observe a difference in SCR 
between each of the states (i.e. SCR for FOKs versus non-FOKs); the participant has 
to partake in minimal activity to reduce cognitive demand. 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Sherer and Mikulka (1996), novelty of faces 
may have played a role in EDA in response to faces. Essentially, every face used in 
this current study was a famous face. And, although it was designed so that the 
familiarity level of the faces (from unfamiliar to familiar) was varied, the fact is that 
every single face was a celebrity face and meant that it was possible that even those 
faces deemed ‘unfamiliar’ by participants may not have been that novel after all. 
There is the possibility that the participant may have seen the face, for example, in a 
movie; without overtly remembering that they had seen the face. Participants were 
also told that all the faces were familiar, therefore they were anticipating familiar 
faces and this may have played a factor in their SCR to the faces. Therefore, future 
research should consider using some definite novel faces to ensure an even mixture of 
familiar and definite unfamiliar faces. 
  
Therefore, as the results do not reveal a difference in SCR between any of the 
states or any of the familiarity levels, this study cannot suggest that experiencing a 
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FOK causes greater psychological arousal, or that experiencing a FOK is based on 
greater psychological arousal. However, future research into metamemory and SCR 
should not be abandoned. Future research should aim to eliminate extra task 
requirements, in order to reduce cognitive demand of the task, with the hope that this 
would eliminate any extra SCR which has occurred as a result of the task 
requirements. The use of novel faces would ensure that at least some of the faces are 
definitely unfamiliar to the participants and would ensure that they are also not 
expecting all of the faces to be familiar. Furthermore, using psychophysiological 
methods with metamemory is a novel research idea and something that could be 
explored further. For example, future research could look at using EEG recordings 
whilst participants make metamemory judgements. 
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
4.1 Interpretations of present findings 
 
The studies in this thesis have explored the nature of the FOK. In particular, 
this thesis has been concerned with the bases of FOKs for names of faces. The FOK is 
a fascinating phenomenon, whereby individuals can quite accurately determine what 
is and what is not within memory, even though that particular piece of information 
cannot currently be recalled. Empirical investigations into the FOK began in the 
1960s, however, no consensus has been made as to what FOKs are based on. 
 
The aim of experiment 1 was to investigate whether FOKs for names of faces 
are based on familiarity with the face (the cue-familiarity hypothesis) or based on the 
ability to retrieve semantic information relating to the given person (an aspect of the 
target-accessibility hypothesis). The study used a method that allowed for the level of 
each of these factors to be measured and assessed in terms of their contribution to 
both the bases of the FOK and to the accuracy of the FOK.  
 
Prior to this study, the inferential theories were favoured for explaining the 
basis of the FOK and previous research, into the basis of FOKs for names of faces, 
supported the cue-familiarity hypothesis (Hosey et al., 2009). The results of 
experiment 1 showed that the likelihood of experiencing a FOK increased 
significantly between each familiarity level. This suggests that as familiarity 
increases, the likelihood of experiencing a FOK increases. Therefore, the results of 
this study provide some support for the cue-familiarity hypothesis and the existing 
research into FOKs for names of faces (Hosey et al., 2009). Although the results from 
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the analyses of this study provide general support for the cue-familiarity hypothesis, 
there are still FOKs that are not accounted for by the cue-familiarity hypothesis. This 
study found that even when the highest level of cue-familiarity was experienced, 
participants didn’t always experience a FOK. In fact, 38% of the time participants 
reported a non-FOK when they found the face highly familiar. This is problematic for 
the cue-familiarity theory that would hypothesise that high familiarity will lead to a 
FOK. 
 
Furthermore, the tested aspect of the target-accessibility hypothesis (semantic 
retrieval) as a determinant of the FOK for names of faces was not fully supported. 
The results of this study found that retrieval of additional semantic information, as 
opposed to just weak semantic information, did not increase the likelihood of a FOK 
(when FOKs were treated as a separate phenomenon to TOTs). This result is not 
consistent with the target-accessibility (Koriat, 1993) theory which would suggest that 
greater amounts of semantic retrieval would increase likelihood of a FOK. However, 
the results did show that retrieving any level of semantic information is a better 
determinant of experiencing a FOK than not retrieving any semantic information at 
all; this is consistent with the target-accessibility theory. Furthermore, non-FOKs 
were still experienced when participants were able to recall a strong amount of 
semantic information, which is problematic for the target-accessibility hypothesis. 
 
Previous research into FOKs for names of faces was limited and suggested 
that FOKs for faces were based on cue-familiarity, based on the research by Hosey et 
al. (2009). However, the study by Hosey et al., (2009) relied rather heavily on 
participants’ introspections as to what had made them report an FOK. Hosey et al., 
 87 
(2009) did not request familiarity ratings or retrieval of semantic information for all of 
the faces that could not be named. It was therefore difficult to determine whether 
feelings of familiarity or retrieval of semantic information were genuinely predictive 
of FOKs (for a detailed overview see the general introduction). However, the current 
study provided a much more objective investigation into what FOKs for names of 
faces are based on, as it did not rely on participant's subjective and retrospective 
reports. Furthermore, the Hosey et al., (2009) study was predestined to result in one of 
two inferential theories (cue-familiarity or target-accessibility) being responsible for 
the cause of FOKs for names of faces, as their study was not designed in a way in 
which could account for any other possible explanations. Whereas, this current study 
did not limit the possible determinants of FOKs to two possible outcomes (cue-
familiarity or target accessibility). This current study also took into account that level 
of cue-familiarity ranges and investigated how differing levels of cue-familiarity may 
influence participants reporting a FOK and their performance on subsequent 
recognition of previously unrecalled target names. 
 
Challenges for the inferential theories 
There are several points that one could claim are a challenge for the inferential 
theories. Accumulating information, or assessing the latency or fluency in which 
information comes to mind (target-accessibility hypothesis) takes time, whereas, 
FOKs seem to occur quickly. Furthermore, FOKs also appear to occur quicker than 
familiarity does. In one study by Paynter, Reder and Kieffaber (2009), event-related 
potentials (ERPs) were recorded to identify the time course of FOKs. The study found 
that the ERPs for familiarity was 300ms following the onset of the stimuli, whereas 
the ERPs for the FOK was only 200ms after the onset of stimuli. This suggests that 
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FOKs may happen before familiarity is assessed and that the initial FOK manifests 
long before the stimuli have been consciously processed. The authors concluded that 
their study demonstrates that initial FOKs are based on processes that ‘come on-line 
quite rapidly’. This suggests that FOKs possibly occur before the individual has made 
inferences; such as assessing the familiarity of the stimuli or assessing the amount, or 
latency, of clues that come to mind during the search-and-retrieval process. 
 
Furthermore, it is apparent that certain clinical groups of individuals have 
impaired FOKs. Research has found that patients with obsessive compulsive disorder 
have lower FOK ratings and make FOK judgements which are not reliable predictors 
of their recognition performance (Tuna, Tekcan & Topcuoglu, 2003). Another study 
suggests a metamemory monitoring deficit in patients with schizophrenia; the results 
revealed that patients had less FOKs and their overall FOK accuracy was significantly 
lower than normal participants (Chiu, Liu, Hwang, Hwu & Hua, 2015). Furthermore, 
it has been found that children with autism spectrum disorder make episodic FOK 
judgements that are not reliable predictors of their recognition performance (Wojcik, 
Moulin & Souchay, 2013). However, despite having impaired FOKs, it would seem 
unlikely that these clinical populations have familiarity impairments. Impaired 
familiarity is a profound inability that should be quite apparent. One would assume 
that if individuals with conditions such as OCD, schizophrenia, or autism spectrum 
disorder, have a familiarity impairment then it would be well documented. If FOKs 
were based on familiarity alone, we would expect these clinical populations to exhibit 
familiarity impairment, but it is unlikely that they do. 
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The trace-access theory (Hart, 1965) has long been abandoned as a competing 
theory for inferential theories. The theory suggests that rather than having to 
accumulate information and make inferences in order to elicit a FOK, perhaps we 
have an intuitive ability to monitor what is and what is not within memory. The idea 
of a monitoring module that has access to memory traces, and is therefore able to 
determine the availability of the sought-after information within memory, would add 
to the efficiency of memory. Having such a memory monitor would, as Hart (1965) 
suggests, add to the efficiency of human memory by saving us time searching 
memory for an item that is not stored. Such a monitor would also allow us to continue 
our search efforts if the monitor signals that the sought-after information does exist 
within memory. However, the trace-access theory is a difficult theory to provide 
support for, as it is difficult to measure what can be directly accessed. 
 
In terms of how well the inferential theories were tested, in this current study, 
raises a couple of questions. The cue-familiarity hypothesis is a relatively straight 
forward hypothesis to test in terms of there being only one factor to test- how familiar 
do participants find the cue (in this case, the face)? Therefore, by requiring 
participants to select a familiarity level on a four-point scale, the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis was sufficiently tested. Previous research had not segregated FOKs and 
non-FOKs into states which could occur with varying levels of cue-familiarity. 
Therefore, by considering familiarity as a dimension with varying levels, rather than 
as black and white (familiarity or no familiarity), has allowed a more thorough 
investigation of the cue-familiarity hypothesis.  
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However, the target-accessibility hypothesis has various factors, or 
determinants, which could be tested. As listed by Koriat (1993), there are various 
clues which the target-accessibility hypothesis suggests FOKs are based on; 
structural, contextual and semantic attributes that are activated from the terms in the 
question, and fragments of the target itself. This current study chose to measure the 
depth of semantic information retrieved by participants. The retrieved semantic 
information was determined as either being none, weak (when the participant could 
recall only the target person’s occupation), or strong (when the participant could also 
recall a fact about the target person). By measuring the depth of retrieved semantic 
information, this study was testing the noncriterial-recollection hypothesis. The 
hypothesis is an expanded view of Koriat's (1993) target-accessibility hypothesis, and 
although it is still based on the idea that clues accumulated during the search-and-
retrieval process are responsible for FOKs, it has an emphasis on the information 
retrieved, rather than on other aspects of the target-accessibility hypothesis (i.e. 
fragments/letters of the target). By investigating just one of the clues suggested by 
Koriat (1993) the other clues were ignored. Therefore, it could be speculated that had 
the other clues have been measured then there would have been the possibility that the 
results may have provided stronger support for the target-accessibility hypothesis. 
Much of the research that tests the target-accessibility hypothesis focuses on testing 
the structural fragments of the target word (e.g. Blake, 1973; Eysenck, 1979). 
However, this current study did not measure the letters recalled for the target word 
because it was thought that when an individual begins to recall letters from the target 
name it is very similar to the definition of a TOT, rather than a FOK. When letters of 
the target name are retrieved the difference between a FOK and a TOT becomes very 
unclear. Another clue that we could have tested for was retrieval of episodic 
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information; such as retrieval of times, places, or associated emotions with the given 
face. Furthermore, this study could also have looked at retrieval latency for 
semantic/episodic information. As Koriat (1993) suggests that the ease of which the 
information comes to mind may impact the FOK judgement more so than the amount 
of information. This is an aspect of the target-accessibility hypothesis that could be 
tested in future research into FOKs for names of faces. 
 
Furthermore, prior to these studies, psychophysiology combined with the 
study of metamemory had not been investigated before. The study aimed to 
investigate the different SCR levels for each metamemory state with a focus on the 
FOK judgement. It was hypothesised that perhaps greater psychophysiological 
arousal in response to stimuli may be what leads participants to report that they are 
experiencing a FOK. However, the results found no difference in SCR between the 
different metamemory states; suggesting that greater psychological arousal does not 
occur as a result of a FOK nor plays a role in the basis of the FOK. 
 
FOKs for faces vs verbal stimuli 
It has long been debated whether faces are special in the sense that there may 
be visual processing mechanisms unique to faces (e.g, Yue, Tjan & Bederman, 2006; 
Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen & Humphreys, 2008). Riddoch et al. (2008) 
highlight that the ability to recognise individual faces is ‘of crucial social importance 
for humans and evolutionarily necessary for survival’. They go on to say that, as a 
consequence of evolution, faces may be considered special stimuli in which we have 
‘developed unique modular perceptual and recognition processes’ in which is 
supported by cases of Prosopagnosia; whereby the patient is unable to recognise faces 
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but their ability to recognise other objects is preserved. Furthermore, even if it is 
disagreed that faces are special in the sense that they are perceived and recognised in 
a special way, which differs to that of other objects, it cannot be claimed that they are 
not special in other ways. For example, McKone and Robbins (2011) highlight that 
there is no doubt that in many ways faces are special functionally; they provide 
information about expression, gaze direction, the person’s identity and they provide 
visual clues to speech; all of which cannot be found in objects. 
 
Therefore, if faces can be considered special in various ways; functionally 
and/or perceptually, it is not illogical to consider that FOKs for faces may be ‘special’ 
too. Due to the way that faces may be perceived differently, the bases of FOKs for 
faces may differ to that of other stimuli. Therefore, it should be considered that any 
suggested determinants for the bases of FOKs for other stimuli (e.g. verbal stimuli; 
trivia questions or word pairs), may not have the same impact on FOKs for faces. This 
distinction between FOKs for faces and FOKs for other stimuli has already been 
discussed by Cleary (2011). Cleary (2011) suggested that future research on FOKs 
could focus on investigating how reliance on cue-familiarity differs between FOKs 
with faces and FOKs for other types of stimuli. It was predicted that faces would 
provide better support for the cue-familiarity hypothesis than other types of stimuli 
(see general introduction) as Aly et al., (2010) suggested that faces require a greater 
reliance on familiarity than do other types of stimuli; suggesting that FOKs for faces 
may rely on different determinants than FOKs for other types of stimuli. 
 
It should be considered that just because this current study provides some 
support for the cue-familiarity hypothesis, it cannot be applied to FOKs for all types 
 93 
of stimuli. It may be that FOKs for faces rely more heavily on cue-familiarity than 
FOKs for other types of stimuli. Therefore, it is important not to generalise the results 
of this current study to FOKs for other types of stimuli due to the fact that faces are 
considered different to other stimuli in terms of functionally and/or perceptually. 
 
In this study, famous names were used as distractors in the recognition task, 
rather than novel names. This is the same method that previous research into FOKs 
for names of faces used (Hosey et al., 2009). Furthermore, items given to participants 
in the multiple-choice (recognition) test have usually been answers which are not 
novel, from when Hart first developed the RJR paradigm (Hart, 1965). Therefore, we 
decided to keep the methodology of the typical RJR paradigm and not use novel 
distractors. It is possible that participants could have used a recall-to-reject strategy, 
whereby they selected the correct answer through eliminating the names that they 
knew were wrong. However, we tried to reduce this somewhat by using distractor 
names that were of the same occupation as the target name. If all novel names had 
been used (with the one correct answer, which would have been potentially the only 
familiar name), this would have caused the participants to opt for the only familiar 
name. Thus, participants would only have selected the correct name because it was 
the only vaguely familiar name. Future research will need to disentangle the roles of 
specific familiarity with a particular face and knowledge of the broad category of 
occupation to the recall-to-reject strategy, perhaps by the use of several familiar 
names (from same or different categories) and several novel names in the recognition 
task. 
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Accuracy of FOKs and non-FOKs   
This thesis also focussed on exploring the factors that may influence the 
accuracy of FOKs. Are FOKs, which are experienced with high cue-familiarity, better 
predictors of subsequent recognition than those FOKs that are experienced with low 
cue-familiarity? Are FOKs, which are experienced alongside retrieval of a strong 
depth of semantic information, better predictors of subsequent recognition than those 
FOKs that are experienced with little or no semantic retrieval? 
 
Experiment 1 aimed to answer these questions and unveiled some interesting 
findings. The results revealed that participants perform better on the recognition test 
when they are experiencing a FOK. However, this is only true when familiarity level 
reaches level 3 and level 4. The best predictors of correct recognition are FOKs in 
which we find the face highly familiar (80% of these type of FOKs led to correct 
recognition). FOKs experienced with level 2 familiarity are no more likely to lead to 
better recognition than non-FOKs. This means that FOKs that are experienced with 
moderate to high levels of familiarity are better predictors of subsequent recognition 
than those FOKs that are experienced with low cue-familiarity. These results are 
consistent with the cue-familiarity theory ((Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993). 
 
The results also revealed that FOKs, with any level of semantic retrieval 
(none, weak, or strong), were more likely to result in the participant performing 
correctly on the recognition test. This result demonstrates that FOKs are accurate 
predictors of subsequent recognition regardless of the level of semantic retrieval. This 
result is problematic for the target-accessibility theory, as it was hypothesised that if 
target-accessibility plays a role in the FOK then we would expect that no semantic 
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retrieval would lead to FOKs with incorrect recognition and strong semantic retrieval 
would lead to FOKs with correct recognition. However, this is not the case and target-
accessibility appears to make no difference to the accuracy of the FOKs. This result 
differs greatly to the impact that cue-familiarity has on the accuracy of FOKs. 
 
  
4.2 Future research 
An interesting direction for future research would be to see what influence 
these factors (cue-familiarity and semantic retrieval) have on the magnitude of FOKs. 
Finding a face very familiar and/or being able to recall a strong depth of semantic 
information may affirm and boost an individual's confidence in their metamemory 
judgements. Therefore, future research could use the same cue-familiarity rating scale 
or assessment of semantic information retrieval, whilst asking participants to select 
their FOK rating. Rather than asking participants if they are experiencing a FOK or 
not, participants would be asked to select from a scale (i.e. no FOK, weak FOK, 
moderate FOK, strong FOK, TOT). It would therefore be possible to determine 
whether cue-familiarity and target-accessibility have an influence on the magnitude of 
FOKs for names of faces. However, the reason that FOK magnitude was not tested in 
this current study is because it would have meant that too many aspects (4 levels of 
familiarity x 4 levels of FOK strength) were being tested, thus further fragmenting the 
data. It may also have led to participants relating their FOK magnitude to their cue-
familiarity rating i.e. if the participant selects level 3 familiarity they would most 
likely feel more inclined to select the coinciding level of FOK magnitude. 
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Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore the other suggested clues from 
Koriat's (1993) theory because, as previously mentioned, this study only looked at one 
aspect; retrieval of semantic information. It would not be possible to refute the target-
accessibility hypothesis as the basis for FOKs of names of faces without further 
exploring the other factors in the target-accessibility hypothesis in relation to names 
of faces. As previously mentioned, these factors include; structural fragments of the 
name, episodic information (such as retrieval of times, places, or associated emotions 
with the given face) and retrieval latency of semantic/episodic information. For 
example, structural fragments of the target word in relation to names of faces could be 
explored in future research, whilst using the same paradigm. This could be achieved 
by measuring the level of cue-familiarity whilst measuring the number of letters from 
the target name that participants can recall. There is the possibility that the ability to 
recall structural information (letters from the target word) combined with high 
familiarity may lead to a FOK.  
 
 
4.3 Final note 
From when FOKs were first subjected to empirical investigation, Hart (1965) 
highlighted why the study of the FOK would be so intriguing. Hart (1967a) suggested 
that the FOK is a fascinating experience, one in which he described as being able to 
demonstrate the link between subjective processes and behavioural processes. By this, 
he was alluding to the subjective experience of a FOK which influences individual’s 
behaviour. As demonstrated in this current research, we can predict future memory 
performance based on subjective experiences (FOKs and TOTs), and we can 
determine what factors will, or will not, affect memory performance based on 
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subjective experiences (i.e. cue-familiarity will influence memory performance when 
an individual does not experience a FOK, but cue-familiarity will not have the same 
effect if the individual is experiencing a FOK). 
 
It is interesting to observe that it is possible to experience a high familiarity 
with a face and be able to retrieve biographical information about the person, yet 
experience a non-FOK. An everyday example would be when you are asked a 
newsreaders name; you find the face highly familiar and you can recall semantic 
information about the person, yet, you know you do not know the name. This ability 
to recall strong semantic information and find the face highly familiar, only led to a 
FOK 63% of the time. 
 
This study has provided some support for both theories; the cue-familiarity 
hypothesis and the target-accessibility hypothesis, but has shown that neither theories 
alone can account for the basis of all FOKs. This study has provided general support 
for the cue-familiarity theory for the basis of the FOK for names of faces, and 
supports other existing research into FOKs for names of faces (Hosey et al., 2009), by 
demonstrating that as cue-familiarity increases so does the occurrence of FOKs. 
However, the finding that non-FOKs occur even when familiarity is high is 
problematic for the cue-familiarity theory and suggests that familiarity alone cannot 
account for all FOKs. The study has shown that cue-familiarity also has an effect on 
participant’s accuracy on a recognition test; suggesting that FOKs with moderate to 
high levels of cue-familiarity are better predictors of subsequent recognition. This 
study has found that retrieving semantic information will increase the amount of 
FOKs reported, which is consistent with the target-accessibility hypothesis. However, 
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there was no significant increase in number of FOKs reported when level of semantic 
retrieval increased from weak to strong (when FOKs were considered as a separate 
phenomenon to TOTs), and this is inconsistent with the target-accessibility 
hypothesis. Furthermore, non-FOKs still arose when participants could recall a strong 
amount of semantic information; this is problematic for the target-accessibility 
hypothesis. Therefore, although this study has provided some support for both 
theories, neither theory can account solely for the basis of the FOK. A combination of 
both theories (dual-hypothesis) also does not provide a sufficient account. Therefore, 
it can be speculated that there is something more to a FOK than merely a feeling of 
familiarity or the ability to recall semantic information. 
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Appendix 
 
Sample Materials 
 
 
Materials for the recall phase: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Materials for the recognition phase: 
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